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NOTE
CONFLICT-OF-INTERESTS OF GOVERNMENT
PERSONNEL: AN APPRAISAL OF THE
PHILADELPHIA SITUATION*
In attempting to insulate public officials from the temptations of partiality, federal, state and local governments have enacted a host of legislation
running the gamut from criminal bribery laws to limitations on lobbying
and the amounts of political contributions. While these laws direct themselves to the problem of favoritism toward others by government personnel,'
another body of law exists which attempts to limit the private interests of
persons in the public service in order to guard against the possibility of
their favoritism toward themselves. This latter body of legislation, loosely
known as "conflict-of-interests" laws, has often been drafted in vague style,
broadly condemning the situation of temptation. The infrequency of their
enforcement suggests that many of these laws may be expressions of desired
moral rectitude pronounced by a legislature, or borrowed from the statute
books of another, without adequate consideration of their practical effects:
their scope of exclusion of persons from governmental service, particularly
in the smaller units of local governments.
The common-law doctrine of conflict-of-interests found its origin in
the law of trusts, which dictated that a trustee could not, without authority,
be pecuniarily interested in the affairs or interests of his beneficiary 2 To
allow such a situation to exist gave rise to the danger that the trustee would
act to enhance his own interests rather than those of his cestui que trust.
The doctrine was soon extended to other representative capacities, 3 including the relationship between a public official and his government.4 When
* The research for this Note was made possible through a grant from the Thomas
Skelton Harrison Foundation, an agency created by the will of Thomas Skelton
Harrison to promote good government in Philadelphia. The Law Review wishes to
thank the many city officials and other persons whose generous cooperation aided in
the completion of this study.
1. Bribery is defined as "the giving of anything of value to any person holding
a public office, or to any person performing a public duty, or the acceptance thereof
by any such person, with the intention that he shall be influenced thereby in the
discharge of his legal duty!' CLARx & MAmsiALL, Cm.s 910 (6th ed. 1958). (Footnote omitted.) A showing of a corrupt intent to influence is necessary. Id. at 912.
Similarly directed to obstruct opportunity of corrupting private pressures are federal
and state lobbying statutes, e.g., 60 Stat. 839 (1946), 2 U.S.C. §§261-270 (1952);
Micr. STAT. ANN. § 2.601 (1952) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-812 (1955), and legislation
providing limits on political contributions, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 608 (1952).
2. 4 Scorr, TRusTs §§ 495-506 (1956).
3. Principally agency and employee relationships. See RESTATEMENT, AGENcY
§§ 387-398 (1933).
4. 2 Dn.Lox, MuciciAL CoPoRATioNs §§ 773-75 (5th ed. 1911).
(985)
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a public official acted in a matter in which he was pecuniarily interested the
action (which in most cases was awardling contracts) was determined void.5
Conflicts legislation in the general sense follows the common-law principle, and commands that public officials shall have no private interests or
activities which the law makers consider will cause a conflict with their
public duties. The inherent difficulty with much of this legislation is that
modern government has acquired so active a position in commerce that
few business and professional people avoid contact with it. By a requirement that aspirants for public office divest themselves of business interests
which are frequently of great value and irrecoverable upon the termination
of their official tenure, many persons who are peculiarly suited for public
service by the very reason of their commercial or professional experience
are deterred from contributing their services to the community. The problem is one of drafting the fine line of distinction between such safeguards
as are necessary to protect the public welfare from self-interested officials,
and those relatively unnecessary clogs which fetter government recruitment where dangers of public harm are more fanciful than real. Unfortunately, much of the contemporary conflicts legislation has been the result
of haphazard adoption of prior formulations without any detailed study of
the conditions and extent of availability of personnel in the particular community.8 Furthermore, drafting style in these statutes has tended to be
so vague and broad that the persons affected are at a loss to know with
any degree of confidence the point at which their business affairs may enter
into the area of proscription, so that their only certain course may seem
a total divorce from non-governmental activities. 7 Similarly, administering
officials and the judiciary, without clear standards to guide them, experience serious difficulty in executing a program of effective enforcement.
Concern for the Philadelphia scheme of conflicts legislation,8 brought
on by a proposed ordinance drastically increasing the conflict-of-interests
coverage, 9 resulted in a field study by the authors of conditions in Philadelphia bearing on the practicality of the present and proposed legislation.
Information was gathered and reactions solicited in interviews with men
experienced in public affairs and persons presently or formerly serving
in public offices. To a considerable extent, this Note is a report on that
5. Ibid.
6. See Kaplan & Lillich, Municipal Conflicts of Interest: Inconsistencies and
Patchwork Prohibitions,58 CoLrum. L. Ray. 157 (1958).
7. See generally, Kaplan & Lillich, supra note 6: McElwain & Vorenberg, The
Federal Conflict of Interest Statutes, 65 HARv. L, REv. 955 (1952); State of New
York, Special Legislative Comm. on Intdgrity and Ethical Standards in Government,
Report and Hearings, LEG. Doc. No. 39 (1954); Note, The Doctrine of Conflicting
Interests Applied to Municipal Officials in New Jersey, 12 RuTGEas L. REv. 582 (1958).
8. Regulation of municipal officers and employees is contained in

PHILADELPHIA,

PA., HOME RurE CHARTER, §§ 10-100-10-111 (hereinafter referred to as CHARTRm).

9. Bill 2119, Philadelphia City Council, March 27, 1958 (hereinafter referred to
as Philadelphia Proposal).
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study, the problems concerning conflicts legislation being dealt with in the
context of empirical data so procured. 10
Concentration was on three major regulatory devices. In part I, we
look to the legislation restricting interests in contracts by the city. Serious
questions concerning the vagueness of these statutes must be explored,
and we shall have also to ask more fundamentally whether there is any
need for such legislation at all in view of competitive bidding practices.
In part II, we explore proposed provisions restricting public officials from
representing private interests before the city agencies and departments,
and the effect which this kind of restriction might have upon the enrollment
of members of the legal profession into public service. Finally, in part
III, there is an analysis and critique of suggested codes-of-ethics as alternative to criminal regulation, and an appraisal of their value in the scheme
of conflict-of-interests regulation.

I.

LEGISLATION CONCERNING INTERESTS IN COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS

Introduction

Measured in monetary terms, the most important area to be scrutinized
for conflicting interest problems is that of commercial dealings by the government. With even municipalities making multimillion dollar expenditures for capital outlays and operational expenses," it is not unlikely that,
where conditions are encouraging, some public officials may be tempted
to exploit this huge market for their personal advantage. If such an official
is permitted to acquire personal interest in a public contract, two very
serious problems can arise. First, if in the course of his duties the official
has some connection with the contract, we are faced with the classic conflictof-interests situation in the sense that he may be committed to choose between his own or his government's best interest. Realistically, it is impossible to show whether in fact his decision in such a matter amounts to selfdealing or not. Secondly, there is a great possibility that an official who
has no immediate administrative connection with the contract may be
sufficiently motivated by his personal interest to exert whatever influence
his position allows to pressure the public official who in fact has a direct
responsibility concerning the contract to favor that personal interest. In
this way, an official without a personal interest in the contract acquires a
conflicting interest in the sense that he must choose between appeasing
the pressuring official and properly discharging his duties in the matter.
10. The study was conducted during the summer of 1958. All letters received
and proposed bills and ordinances are on file in Biddle Law Library, University of
Pennsylvania.
11. E.g., the operational budget for the city of Philadelphia for 1959, exclusive of
payroll expense, runs over $200,000,000.
mANAC 96 (1959).
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Experience indicates the harm that may flow from these two situations.
Contracts may be awarded that are over-priced or unnecessary, or the
performance rendered under the contract may be inferior, all because of
official favoritism, compromise or intentional oversight.' 2 Even if the abuse
is nothing more than partiality in awarding a contract, it may import an
aspect of unfairness into public administration, engendering popular disrespect for government.
Statutory Regulation
With minor variations,'" the most common form of statutory conflicts
regulation in the contract area prohibits public officials from having "any
direct or indirect interest" in public contracts. 14 The "direct or indirect"
15
terminology has been criticized as providing too vague a standard, particularly in view of the severe sanctions which may be imposed upon
violation. Officials with conflicting interests within these statutes may be
17
made criminally responsible "I or may suffer forfeiture of public office.
The contract will be determined void,' 8 with nonperformance by the government resulting in loss of profits and, in most instances, loss of incurred
costs to the private contracting party.19 Or, if the transaction is complete,
20
profits earned may be recovered by the government.
12. See, e.g., STEFFNmS, SHAMSE OF THE CITIES (1904, reprint 1948).
13. Some enactments use a standard of any interest, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE § 733.78
(Anderson 1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 12673 (1957). Others declare what
relationships constitute an interest, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 434 (1952) (officer, agent or
member of firm contracting with the federal government) ; NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-147
(1954) (agent, official or employee of contracting firm).
14. E.g., considering first city governments, the clause appears in BosToN, MAss.,
CITY CHARTER § 8; CoLumus, OHIO, Crry CHARTER § 227; Nav YoRa, N.Y., Crny
CHARTER §886; PnLADELPHrA, PA., HomE RULE CHARTER § 10-100. At the state
level, see MicH. CoNsT. art. V, §25; Miss. CODE ANN. §109 (1956); N.M. STAT.

ANN. § 14-10-18 (1953). At the federal level, 18 U.S.C. §431 (1952).
15. Kaplan & Lillich, supra note 6; Note, The Doctrine of Conflicting Interests
Applied to Municipal Officials in New Jersey, 12 RUTGERS L. REv. 582 (1958).
16. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §434 (1952) (2 years imprisonment, $2,000 fine or both);
FLA. STAT. ANN § 839.09 (1944) (1 year imprisonment or $500 fine) ; MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 610.20, 620.04 (1947) (1 year imprisonment, $1,000 fine, or both); N.Y.
PEN. LAWS §§ 1868, 1937 (1 year imprisonment, $500 fine, or both); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 71, §776.8 (Supp. 1958) (1 year imprisonment, $1,000 fine, or both); BosToN,
MASS., CITY CHARTER § 8 (1 year imprisonment, $1,000 fine, or both); MIAmi, FLA.,
Crry CHARTER § 4C (90 days imprisonment, $300 fine).
17. E.g., CoLUmsus, OHIO, CiTy CHARTm § 227 ("forfeit his office or employ-

ment"). Under Pennsylvania law an official who has violated a criminal statute is
subject to ouster from office by a writ of quo warranto. See, e.g., Commonwealth
ex rel. Blakeley v. Egan, 234 Pa. 24, 82 Atl. 1098 (1912).
18. See cases collected Annot., 134 A.L.R. 570 (1941). Furthermore, a few
charters specifically provide that such a contract shall be void. E.g., BoSToN, MASS.,
CITY CHARTER § 8 ("a violation . . . shall render the contract . . . voidable at the
option of the city").
19. See generally, Lillich, Municipal Conflicts of Interest: Rights and Remedies
Under an Invalid Contract,27 FORDHAm L. REv. 31 (1958).
20. See generally, Lenhoff, The Constructive Trust as a Remedy for Corruption
in Public Office, 54 CoLum. L. REV. 214 (1954). Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§ 1548 (1957) (failure to disclose interest in contracts let by housing authority "shall
render such member or employee liable to surcharge in favor of the Authority to the
full amount of such profit").
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The Philadelphia Story
The major regulation affecting the commercial activities of councilmen, officers and employees of the City of Philadelphia appears in two
separate provisions in article X of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter.2 '
With one exception which will be discussed later, 22 these provisions prohibit
identical acts of conduct, and, without distortion of meaning, may be combined as follows:
"[City councilmen,] the Mayor, the Managing Director, the Director
of Finance, the Personnel Director, any department head, any City
employee, and any other governmental officer or employee whose salary
is paid out of the City Treasury shall not benefit from and shall not be
interested directly or indirectly in any contract for the purchase of
property of any kind nor shall they be interested directly or indirectly
in any contract for the erection of any structure or the supplying of
any service to be paid for out of the City Treasury. ...
"
Violation constitutes a misdemeanor, subject to fine or imprisonment or
both, as well as removal from office. 23
In the eight years in which the Charter has been in operation, there
has been neither formal administrative nor formal judicial interpretation of
either of these sections.2 4 Nor is there any report of a single instance in
which enforcement of the provisions was attempted. While on the one
hand this may seem to speak very highly of the integrity of the administration since the adoption of the Charter, there is the possibility, at least
as to certain portions of the above sections, that the absence of enforcement has resulted from an uncertainty as to the operation of their broad
provisions.
a. Persons Covered
It is at least clear that, given their literal meaning, the terms of the
Charter include all salaried personnel in the executive and legislative
branches of the city government. Uncertainty may exist, however, as to
a sizeable group of men serving without compensation 25 or on a per diem
21. CHARTER § 10-100 governs the actions of councilmen. The other of the officers
and employees are subject to § 10-102.
22. See note 78 infra and accompanying text.
23. CHRxam § 10-109.
24. City Solicitor of Philadelphia, Formal Opinion No. 50, Oct. 15, 1952, mentions these sections only summarily. No extensive analysis is given.
25. All members of boards and commissions serve without compensation save the
civil service commission members, CHARma § 3-804, until city council votes them a
salary. CHARTER § 3-601. The Charter itself provides for twenty-four such boards.
CHARTER § 3-100. And the Mayor may appoint others as they are needed. CHARTER
§ 3-917. At present approximately 175 men are serving in these capacities. THE
EVENING & SUNDAY BULEIN, ALMANAC 273-83 (1959).
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basis 26 as members of city boards and commissions, bodies which fulfill
27
It
important administrative, quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative functions.
of
proven
with
men
has been the practice to staff many of these agencies
ability in the business and professional world who are willing to serve;
and apparently the assumption has been made that the Charter provisions
do not apply, for many prominent businessmen who engage in extensive
commercial dealings with the city have served and are presently serving
in these positions.
The question of their coverage cannot be said to be wholly free from
doubt. It is dependent upon whether such an official may be qualified as
"any City employee"; and, as to the board member serving for per diem
wage compensation, whether he may not also fall within the phrase "any
other governmental officer or employee whose salary is paid out of the City
Treasury." There are no court decisions in point. The fact that persons
serving on boards and commissions are referred to solely as "members"
8
and not "employees" throughout the other provisions of the Charter 2
would tend to indicate that the conflict-of-interests sections do not apply
to them. Furthermore, an official serving intermittently and without compensation would not, in the ordinary connotation of the word, be thought

of as having employee status.

Nevertheless, it might be argued that

those officials who receive remuneration on a per diem basis are "governmental officer[s] or employee[s]" paid a "salary" out of the city treasury.
It is suggested that this latter clause was intended to relate rather to other
than city personnel, e.g., county or state officials who, because of the city-

county consolidation, are supported by the city government treasury. 29
26. Currently, members of the Tax Review Board and the Zoning Board of
Appeals receive $50 per diem from the city up to a maximum of $5,000. See note
91 infra.
27. See CHARTER f§ 3-900-17; BuREAu OF MUNICIPAL RESEARCH & PENNSYLVANIA ECONOMY LEAGUE (EASTERN DIVISION), PHILADELPHIA GOVERNMENT 29-30

(1956).

28. See CHARTER f§ 3-104, 3-207, 3-208, 3-601, 3-800, 3-900.
29. Prior to 1951 there existed coextensive with the city government of Philadelphia a separate political unit, the county government. Offices, such as the District
Attorney and the City Commissioners, were then county officers free from city fiscal
controls and civil service regulation. On November 6, 1951, the state electorate
approved the city-county consolidation amendment, passed by the General Assembly
in 1949, designed to bring all county offices within the Home Rule Charter framework.
PA. CONsT. art. XIV, § 8, cl. 1. To what extent city-county integration has taken
place is unclear. See Note, PhiladelphiaHone Rule Charter and City-County Consolidation u der the Pennsylvania Conetitution, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 84, 85-91 (1957).
While on the one hand the amendment specifically provided that the former county
officers "shall continue to perform their duties and be elected, appointed, compensated
and organized in such manner as may be provided by . . . the Constitution and
the laws of the Commonwealth in effect at the time this amendment becomes effective
* .
. ," PA. CoNST. art. XIV, § 8, cl. 7, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Lennox
v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355, 93 A.2d 843 (1953), made it clear that the Charter governed
former county officers on matters which can be characterized as "persorel" and
"internal administration" as opposed to "duties and functions". Thus, while the
Charter makes no provision for these offices as far as setting out their functions and
responsibilities goes, conflicts regulation may be deemed "personnel" regulation which
is meant to apply to the "other governmental officials" for whom the Charter makes
no other express provisions.
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At any rate, as board and commission members are not clearly included,
and as the provisions of the statute, being penal, must be narrowly construed, the courts will probably read such unpaid or per diem compensated
members out of the conflicting interests prohibition. Normatively, too,
their exclusion seems the better result. The governmental duties of these
officials, although very important, have no such relation to public contracting as would make undesirable their interest as private parties in government contracts. 30 And the peculiar qualities, in terms of community
stature, business acumen and experience, and devotion to local civic interests, demanded of these men, make advisable the imposition of as few restrictions as possible upon the field of possible selection.
b. Official Connection With the Contract
While the common-law censure of conflicting interests related only to
those government officials whose public duties involved the awarding of
government contracts or the supervision of performance of such contracts,3 1
the literal purport of the Charter is broader. It, in terms, requires that
the persons subject to the act have not "any" interest in city government
contracts. The draftsmen have indicated that their purpose was to include
even those government personnel whose official positions presented no
opportunity for direct self-dealing, but only a possibility of exertion of
32
influence.
The courts, of course, are not bound by the drafter's statements, and
it remains to be seen whether they will interpret the Charter provisions
to the full extent of their literal reach. Some indication may perhaps be
found in two Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions rendered prior to
enactment of the Charter under substantially similar legislation. Commonwealth ex rel. Blakeley v. Egan33 involved a quo warranto proceeding
against the borough treasurer of East Pittsburgh. The borough's police
chief and street commissioner had on several occasions contracted with a
corporation in which the borough treasurer was a stockholder and officer.
Although the jury made special findings that the treasurer did not know
of the contracts until after they had been performed, and had only learned
30. Note that what is at issue under the Charter provisions is not disqualification
from their administrative or quasi-judicial functions of any member having an interest
in the subject matter of the proceeding, as to which see part II of this Note. Application of the conflict-of-interests prohibition to board and commission members would
merely incapacitate for such service those who had any contractual dealings with the
city. For our conclusion that public officials generally, except for those directly
involved in the public procurement system, should not be barred from interest in
government contracts, see text accompanying and following note 77 infra.
31. See Kaplan & Lillich, supra note 6, and cases cited therein. The theme of
this article is that the legislation supplementing the common-law coverage has been
erroneously interpreted to include situations beyond self-dealing. Our inquiry here
is to determine whether Pennsylvania courts in particular have so interpreted the
Pennsylvania statute.
32. See Annot., PHI.ADELPHIA HOME RuLE CHPA'
ANN. § 10-100 (1951).
33. 234 Pa. 24, 82 Aft. 1098 (1912).
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about them when he signed certain vouchers for the payments on the contracts, the court sustained his dismissal. Similar proceedings came before
the court in Commonwealth ex rel. Whitehouse v. Harris.34 There, other
officers of the borough of which defendant was the burgess contracted with
a company which employed defendant. Defendant contended that the
supplies had been ordered without any knowledge on his part through
either his governmental or his private position, and that payment had been
made without his signature. The court again sustained the ouster.
While in neither of these cases had the defendant actually awarded
the contract, both officials had had some connection with the contractual
dealings involved, although, in point of time, after the contract had been
performed. Both the treasurer in the Egan case and the burgess in Harris
were charged with the duty of effecting payment for the supplies purchased. The court stressed these facts as indicating a reasonable basis for
imputing knowledge of the contracts to the defendants, although no express
finding of actual knowledge was required to sustain the writs. These
cases, then, in which some official relation to the contract at issue was
found, do not control the question of whether a city officer or employee
may be held to have violated the Charter provisions when his official duties
do not concern any aspect of the contractual dealings.
c. Extent of Interest
The Charter provisions employ a dual test of interest in contracts,
prohibiting both the receipt of a "benefit from," and a "direct or indirect
interest in" government contracts.8 5 The "benefit" language is relatively
novel, and because of its apparently greater breadth and vagueness raises
important questions of constitutionality. The "direct/indirect" terminology,
however, is standard and has been subjected to a considerable amount of
judicial interpretation. To better describe the coverage of the Charter,
this latter test will first be separately considered.
Ownership as a Conflicting Interest
The courts have had no difficulty in holding that complete ownership
of an enterprise contracting with the municipality, either as sole proprietor 3 6 or as one hundred per cent stock owner,37 amounts to a direct
or indirect interest. It is readily seen that this sort of unity of pecuniary
purpose gives rise to the greatest degree of self-interest. The more difficult problem is presented when the official is only part owner of a business
association. In a few scattered decisions the courts have held partner34.
35.
36.
(1929).
37.

248 Pa. 570, 94 Ati. 251 (1915).
See CHARTER quoted in text following note 22 supra.
In re Appeal From the Report of Township Auditors, 95 Pa. Super. 401
See generally cases collected Annot., 140 A.L.R. 344 (1942).
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ship 38 or co-ownership interests 39 by an official sufficient to void a contract
entered into between a business entity and the municipality. In these
cases, however, the partial share amounted to a substantial part of the
enterprise. No decision has been found where the contract was challenged
or a writ of quo warranto or criminal indictment was issued, where the
basis of the action was a minor, relatively insignificant ownership interest.
Shareholdings in a close corporation might also be deemed to fall within
the statutory ban. However, research discloses no Pennsylvania case
where the issue turned solely upon an officer's shareholdings. The few
cases in which shareholdings are referred to also discover the interested
official to be an officer or director in the contracting corporation; it is this
combined relationship which has been held to suffice within the "direct or
indirect interest" test.40 To the extent that a close corporation is in
essence an incorporated partnership, these entities should receive identical
treatment.
Arguably, there will be some point when the ownership interest will
become too small as compared to the whole to give rise to temptation
which might be reasonably feared as calculated to lead an official to
derogate from the city's best interests in his decisions. Yet such an
ownership interest, although without the purpose of the statutory provisions, might well remain within their literal scope. Presumably, the
most common instance of such interest would be the case where officials
hold for investment purposes a number of shares of common or preferred
stock, or of some other equity security (including convertible bonds, stock
warrants, etc.) in a corporation whose stock is traded on national exchanges. No Pennsylvania court has ever been presented with the question
of whether this type of interest falls within the test. One commentator
on New York law suggests that in voiding contractual transactions its
courts will not look to the size of the shareholdings involved. 41 This view
is based in part upon a case involving a municipal officer who held only
one share of stock of a corporation. The interest was held to be against
public policy and the contract void, but even here the interested official
was also a director of the contracting corporation. 42 New Jersey, in an
early case,4 3 went to the extreme and held that a councilman's holding
of a single share of a small corporation as collateral security for a debt,
which share was apparently of little value because of the insolvency of the
contracting corporation, was sufficient to void his vote regarding the trans38. City of Philadelphia v. Durham, 16 Pa. Dist. 81 (C.P. 1907).
39. Commonwealth cx rel. Kutz v. Witman, 217 Pa. 411, 66 At. 986 (1907).
40. Commonwealth ex rel. Blakely v. Egan, 234 Pa. 24, 82 Atl. 1098 (1912);
Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. De Camp, 177 Pa. 112, 35 At. 601 (1896) ; Kennett
Elec. Light Co. v. Borough of Kennet Square, 4 Pa. Dist. 707 (C.P. 1895). Cf.
Robinson v. Wilkinsburg & E.P. St. Ry., 32 PTsBuRGH LJ. 369 (C.P. 1902).
41. Kaplan & Lillich, supra note 6, at 179.
42. People ex rel. Schenectady Illuminating Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 166 App.
Div. 758, 151 N.Y. Supp. 1012 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
43. Foster v. Cape May, 60 N.J.L. 78, 36 Ati. 1089 (Sup. Ct 1897).
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action. Cases indicate that the question is perplexing and unsettled
throughout the other jurisdictions.4 4
Recently, an ordinance was introduced in the Philadelphia city council
that would have made an exception to coverage under conflicts legislation
of an official who holds less than one per cent interest in a corporation whose
stock is publicly held. 4 5 Similarly, proposed federal legislation would
draw a line at twenty per cent.46 Legislation of this sort seems desirable.
Of course, when a line is drawn at a set amount some persons will fall
within the terms of the act who are without its policy inasmuch as their
stockholdings would in fact in no way influence their official decisions.
Likewise some persons excluded might engage in self-interested dealings.
But to attempt in statute a regulation which would accurately predict the
peculiar subjective propensity to corruption of each individual official would
be futile. Rather, such prophylactic legislation should aim at a precise
certainty of application, drawing clear categorical lines at points of approximation arbitrarily chosen. That a one per cent, or a twenty per cent,
shareholder's interest is legislatively deemed too slight a temptation to
pervert officials in the vast bulk of cases, justifies sharp statutory cleavage
at one or the other of these numbers. Below the cut-off line, where prohibition would in general merely inconvenience public officials, whose every
small investment might otherwise run the danger of subsequent corporate
transactions quite unknown to them, and embarrass corporations, whose
contracting officers have no control over ownership of outstanding traded
shares, without appreciably advancing the public interest, business transactions should be accorded security. It is more important here to allow an
incumbent or a candidate for public service to know where he stands under
the act than to worry about coverage of the rare borderline case.
Employment as a Conflicting Interest
With regard to the kind of positions of employment in a contracting
business association which will amount to a conflicting interest, the law is
fairly well settled that positions as officers and directors meet the "direct
or indirect interest" test.4 7 A more difficult problem is presented in ascertaining whether non-officer employees of firms are similarly treated. Only
one Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, Commonwealth ex rel. Whitehouse
48
v. Harris,
dealt with such an employment relationship, and this arose
under a statute that in express terms barred persons who held specified
official posts from being employees in corporations contracting with the
44. See cases collected Annot., 140 A.L.R. 344 (1942).
45. Philadelphia Proposal § 20-104(1) (c).
46. S. 3979, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. (1958).
47. Commonwealth ex rel. Blakeley v. Egan, 234 Pa. 24, 80 Al. 1098 (1912);
Connnonwealth ex rel. Graham v. De Camp, 177 Pa. 112, 35 At. 601 (1896).
48. 248 Pa. 570, 94 Atl. 251 (1915).
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city.49 The defendant's job with the contracting firm was such that he had
no knowledge or control over the contracts, and he had not been personally
connected with the purchase in his government position. While the court
found itself compelled by the words of the statute to sustain his dismissal,
the opinion suggests that had there been any such leeway as the direct/indirect standard affords, the court would have arrived at a contrary
result. One lower court decision involving the employment situation under
a statute generally condemning "interests" in contracts is in accord with
0
this suggestion. In Dunlap v. City of Philadelphia,5
the court held that a
councilman who was a salaried employee of the contracting firm did not
have a conflicting interest. The court stated that "interest" within the
meaning of the statute meant a "pecuniary interest," and held that since
the defendant's salary was fixed and not dependent on the amount of sales
by his employer, no such interest existed. This concept of pecuniary
interest comes from the common-law doctrine of conflicting interests,,' i of
which the court apparently felt the statute was declaratory.
It is difficult to generalize from this sparse authority as to the effect
of employment by a contracting firm in any position lower than top
managerial posts. We may suggest, however, that salaried employment,
of itself, should not constitute a conflicting interest.62 The Dunlap case
indicates that an appropriate inquiry in each case would be whether the
employee will receive some immediate benefit from the awarding or performance of the contract, as, e.g., direct commissions, or special managerial
favor. Indirect and long-range benefits which may accrue to the employee
from his employer's general prosperity seem too tenuous a motive to permit
the inference of a legislative intent to impose criminal sanctions in such
cases. But courts will not be blind to the opportunities for self-advancement
within a firm which may inhere in an employee's dual role in contracting
transactions. Where the public official's duties, either on the side of the
private enterprise or of the government, involve direct responsibility for
the contract in question, the courts will be not unlikely to find a prohibited
conflicting interest in even the simple employment relationship.
Other Relationships
Numerous other commercial relationships to parties contracting with
the government suggest themselves to the imagination. Judicial authority
is sparse, but the few cases which may be found tend to indicate a general
49. "[N]or shall any such burgess . . . be a member of any partnership, or a
stockholder or officer of any corporation, or agent or employee of any individual
partnership, or corporation. . . ." Pa. Laws, 1907, P.L. 262, repealed, Pa. Laws,
1931, P.L. 386 § 30. In the opinion, the court merely refers to the defendant as a
salaried employee of the owner of the contracting firm, without making clear what
his precise duties were other than that they did not relate to the dealings in question.
50. 13 Weekly Notes of Cases 99 (Pa. C.P. 1883). As in Commonwealth ex rel.
Whitehouse v. Harris, 248 Pa. 570, 94 Atl. 251 (1915), the court only refers to the
councilman as a salaried employee of the contracting firm.
51. 2 DiLLoN, MUNICIPAL CouoRA.0 oNs § 773 (5th ed. 1911).
52. Compare Kaplan and Lillich, supra note 6, at 178-79 and cases cited therein.
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pattern. In Wilson v. City of New Castle 5 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the interest of a general creditor of a contracting party was
not a sufficiently personal and private interest to be violative of the applicable conflicts legislation. In that case the defendant, city mayor, was a
director of the bank to which the private contractor was indebted. On the
other hand, it was held in Commonwealth ex rel. Gardnerv. Elliot 5 that
a councilman who casually aided his brother to perform painting work for
the city had gained a prohibited interest in his brother's contract. The
councilman was not regularly employed by his brother, but was paid for his
help on this particular job. One lower court, following Elliot, held that
a councilman who subcontracted work from the prime government contractor had acquired a conflicting interest in the government contract.r
The thread which appears to run through these cases is similar to that
found in the employment cases: that monetary gain which may be traced
directly to the specific government contract involved will be severely viewed
by the courts as a violative "direct or indirect" interest, while gain which is
reflective only of the general long-term financial well-being of the contracting party will generally be deemed insufficient.
The general vagueness of the "direct or indirect interest" standard
becomes impressively apparent when one considers the great body of miscellaneous potential financial relationships. Even as to relationships which
may be described by established judicial categories, e.g., ownership or
employment, the maximal limits of permissible "interest" remain only
faintly suggested by the limited judicial authority. The hazards to public
servants are particularly serious in the smaller units of local government
like the city, where the level of public compensation is such that complete
divorcement from private commercial enterprises can hardly be expected
of government officials. The addition of the secondary standard of "benefit from" government contracts only serves vastly to multiply the problem.
While no authoritative interpretation of the phrase has been discovered,
it is at least apparent that its addition was intended to cover relationships
beyond the reach of the "direct or indirect" interest terminology. It might
well include the creditor relationship of the Wilson case, and could at the
extreme be stretched to cover even "benefit" to public officials from improvement of streets adjacent to their residences under a public works
contract. While it may be unreasonable to ascribe such an unrealistic
purpose to the legislature, the vagueness of this phrase in criminal legislation appears to be of such proportion as even perhaps to lay the statute
open to successful constitutional attack.5 6
53. 301 Pa. 358, 152 At. 102 (1930).
54. 291 Pa. 98, 139 Ati. 626 (1927).
55. Commonwealth v. Bolton, 25 Luz. L. Reg. Rep. 5 (Pa. C.P. 1928).
56. "The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute
that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated
conduct is forbidden by the statute." Chief Justice Warren in United States v.
Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). Cf. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939);
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
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The Need for Conflicts Legislation in View of
Philadelphia'sProcurement System
Conflict-of-Interests and Competitive Bidding
Assuming such wide scope to the Charter provisions as we have
above developed, inquiry must now be directed to the need for so drastic
a limitation upon the public service in view of the employment in Philadelphia of a competitive bidding system. As set up by the Home Rule
Charter, except in some instances,"T the city's power to let contracts is
centralized in one agency called the Procurement Department. 8 Briefly,
its system operates as follows: 9 Other city departments and agencies
submit requisitions for their needs. Except for public works contracts, 0
the Procurement Department standardizes the type of goods requested,61
then channels the requisitions to the purchasing team responsible for procuring the particular type of item.0 2 These teams in turn solicit bids from
suppliers of the kind of items wanted, referring to a list maintained by the
department, of suppliers who regularly deal with the city, and consulting
catalogues and other brochures sent in by dealers and manufacturers. If
the estimated value of the purchase exceeds two thousand dollars, the
request for bids must be publicly advertised.a At a set cut-off date,
57. Although not expressly provided by the Charter it has been administratively
ruled that municipal departments and agencies may avail themselves of petty cash
funds to make purchases which do not exceed twenty-five dollars, without direct
supervision of any other agency. However, before these petty cash funds can be
replenished through further appropriations they are scrutinized by the Procurement
Department and by the other departments which would normally check purchases.
See note 70 infra. Other types of transactions not channelled through the Procurement
Department are dispositions and acquisitions of realty, CHAREa § 5-900(a) (4);
maintenance, acquisition and disposition of wharf, dock and harbor facilities, CHARIR
§ 4-500(b). Furthermore, as provided by the CHARTa, § 8-200(1), the purchase of
"unique goods" is not required to be accomplished via the Procurement Department.
However, it is standard practice to have such purchases channelled through the Procurement Department. See generally BuREAu OF MuNIcIPAL RESEARCH & PENNSYLVANIA ECONOMY LEAGUE (EAsTERN DmSiON), PHH.ADELPHiA GOVERNMENT 33944 (1956).
58. CHARTER § 6-500.
59. Much of the information herein contained concerning purchasing procedure
was received in an Interview With Mr. George B. O'Gorman, Director of Purchasing
of the Procurement Department of Philadelphia, in Philadelphia, Feb. 11, 1959.
60. Planning and specification for the construction of buildings is handled by the
Department of Public Property, CHARTER § 5-900; for streets and paving by the
Department of Streets, CHARER § 5-500; for water supply and construction necessary
thereto by the Water Department, CAmRTER § 5-800.
61. CHARm § 6-500 (a) (1) provides in part: "For the purpose of exercising its
procurement functions more efficiently and economically, the Department shall classify
all items of personal property subject to procurement by it; maintain a laboratory
for testing and inspecting such property; adopt as standards the minimum number
of qualities, sizes and types of such items consistent with efficient operation; and
prepare, promulgate and enforce, written specifications for all such standard items."
62. This is an intra-departmental channelling. Presently there are six two-man
purchasing teams in the Procurement Department. Each team does specialty purchasing of particular types of items.

63. CHAarER §8-200(2) (a).
64. The Procurement Department, in order to avoid confusion and promote efficiency, designates a specific day of the week as the cut-off date for the receipt of
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the bids received are opened and awarded to the lowest responsible bidder. 5
Contractors may be present at the opening of the bids.66 The winning bidder must bond his performance. 7 A contract is drawn, and must be
approved for necessary appropriations by the auditing department in the
office of the Director of Finance.6 8 Upon performance of the contract the
work done or goods received are checked by inspectors from both the
Procurement Department and the agency receiving the goods or services
to assure that the city is receiving proper quality and quantity. Finally,
payment is made through the city treasurer's office 69 after all the requisite
70
prior approvals have been received.
As a practical matter, therefore, a great deal of the risk of loss feared
from conflicting interests is removed: the city is assured of the best available price by competitive bidding; of adequate performance by bonding;
of proper quality and quantity by the multiple inspection procedure; and
of the necessity of the expenditure by check of the auditing department
prior to approval of the contract. Finally, since the lowest responsible
bidder must get the contract, there need be no fear of partiality in the
award. Recently, in fact, the New York State Legislature has recognized the effectiveness of such a procurement system in removing dangers
stemming from conflicting interests. In 1954, it adopted conflict-ofinterests legislation proposed by an eminent special committee requested
by the then Governor, Thomas E. Dewey, 71 to study the conflict problem
in New York. In substance, this legislation provides that the conflict-ofinterests rule condemning official interests in government contracts shall
bids for each type of contract. Thus, for example, the cut-off date for contracts
which do not exceed two thousand dollars is Wednesday. Bidders know that their
bids will be opened only on that day for that type of contract. However, since speed
may be of the essence in some particular purchases, requests may be made by the
Procurement Department for "letter bids." These are informal; the normal two week
period between notification and opening of bids is waived. But prior to the award
of the contract, which, in these cases also, is by competitive bidding, performance
bonds must still be filed. Thus a faster purchase is accomplished at only a slight
sacrifice of the procedural safeguards normally employed.
65. CHARTER §8-200(2) (b).
66. Ibid. However, in actual practice it seems that the opening of bids, except
those for public works contracts, are not attended by the public to any great extent.
Nevertheless, there is an employee from the city controller's office present, to assure
regularity. Moreover, the department has established a mechanical ritual in opening
the bids, providing for sealed boxes with slots into which the bids are dropped, and
opening these boxes in a large bidding room on spacious tables, so that everyone
present may witness the propriety of the proceeding.
67. CHARTER §§ 8-200(2) (c), 200(2) (e).

68.
69.

CHARTER
CHARTER

§ 6-104. See also
§§ 6-301, 8-101.

CHARTER

§ 6-103.

70. Each purchase is subject to supervision (1) by the Director of Finance to
"determine whether equipment, material or supplies are presently available [out of
municipal stores] so as to render unnecessary contemplated purchases of additional
equipment, material or supplies," CHARTER § 6-103, and whether there is an availability
of appropriated funds, CHARER §§ 6-104, 106; (2) by the Auditing Department under
the City Controller to determine whether it is "for a purpose comprehended by the
appropriation against which it is drawn and in a proper amount," CHARTER §§ 6-400,
8-101.
71. See State of New York, Special Legislative Comm. on Integrity and Ethical
Standards in Government, Report and Hearings 14, 25, LEG. Doc. No. 39 (1954).
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apply only in situations where the contract was not awarded after public
72
notice and competitive bidding.
Rather than hastily endorsing the adoption of legislation removing the
conflict-of-interests ban, however, one must stop to consider a number of
troublesome aspects of such a program. Admittedly, the phasing of functions between the requisitioning agency, the auditing department, the Procurement Department and inspection teams creates a sufficient framework
of checks and balances effectively to reduce the power of any single official
outside the procurement system to control a transaction so as to effectuate
private benefit to himself. However, all persons within the procuring
procedure itself must of necessity have some official connection with the
contract, and therefore, as to their own specific function, will still be able
to effectuate some degree of self-dealing.
Some particularly troublesome situations may be suggested. When
the expected value of a purchase is less than the two thousand dollar
figure prerequisite for compulsory public advertising, the members of purchasing teams have a very wide discretion in selecting which suppliers
are to be notified that bids are requested. Conceivably, a team member
might so select his bidders as to assure that the firm in which he was
interested submitted low bid. Further, the procurement department has
discretion in determining who is a "responsible bidder." 73 Again, if self72. N.Y. Pu. OFFicERs LAW § 73. Functionally, governmental contracting in
New York State is very similar to that pursued under the Home Rule Charter. The
standardization and procurement of most goods and materials is accomplished through
the office of the Commissioner of Standards and Purchase. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW
§ 161. However, unlike Philadelphia, the preparation and contracting for public works
is divorced from the control of the Commissioner of Standards and Purchase and
centralized in another comparable agency, the Superintendent of Public Works.
N.Y. PuB. BLDG. LAW §§6, 8. In each case contracts are subject, within limits, to
competitive bidding and public advertisement. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 174; N.Y.
PuB. BLDG. LAW §8. In contracting for goods and materials the Commissioner of
Standards and Purchase has the authority to let contracts with an estimated value
of less than one thousand dollars without competitive bidding, and he may permit
the requisitioning departments to make direct purchases without competitive bidding
for amounts not exceeding five hundred dollars. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 174. The
New York system, therefore, differs from that of Philadelphia both as to what may be
purchased directly by the requisitioning agencies, and as to whether the central purchasing agency can award low-priced contracts without competitive bidding. In both
instances, New York practice appears the less stringently controlled by the centralized
competitive bidding principle. As in Philadelphia, all purchases in New York State
are subject to financial check and inspection. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW §§ 109-14;
N.Y. Pus. BLDG. LAW § &
73. CHART
§§ 8-200(1), 8-200(2) (b). The phrase lowest responsible bidder
has not been given a statutory definition in the Charter. However, it has been commonly used in legislation governing governmental contracting, and case law has so
far developed to lend it a fairly stable interpretation. While financial status is
important in determining what constitutes a "responsible bidder," the multitudinous
factors that go into the make-up of a competent and successful businessman are
important. See generally City of Philadelphia v. Pemberton, 208 Pa. 214, 57 At.
516 (1904); Relly v. City of Easton, 21 Northam. Law Rep. 307 (Pa. C.P. 1928);
Cramer v. City of Philadelphia, 7 Phila. (Pa.) 429 (C.P. 1870).
The New York system also provides that contracts shall "be let to the lowest
responsible bidder, as will best promote the public interest, taking into consideration
the reliability of the bidder, the qualities of the articles proposed to be supplied, their
conformity with the specifications, the purposes for which required, and the terms
of delivery. . . ." N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 174.
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interest is operating upon the official charged with a determination of this
sort, corrupted awards may result. In addition, there exists under the
Charter the power to reject all bids if such rejection is in the best interests of the city. 74 One of the reasons for this provision is to permit the
city, when it has received an attractively low but too late bid, which for
want of timeliness cannot be considered for the award, to nullify the entire
prior bid proceeding, and thus secure to the city the advantage of a significantly lower offer without giving the late bidder an undue advantage
over others. In a recent instance concerning the purchase of transportation equipment, the Mayor of Philadelphia utilized the bid rejection
power when it appeared that a foreign supplier had submitted the lowest
bid. The Mayor's ground for requesting resubmission-that it would be in
the city's interest to award the contract to a domestic firm-suggests the
wide scope of discretion which may be here invoked. With so broad latitude, it is not impossible that the rejection provision might be subtly employed to benefit a favored bidder or interest. Should he not submit low
bid, all bids could be rejected; and upon re-bidding, if the prior low
bidder has not been discouraged, the favored supplier is at least presented
opportunity to meet the lower offer. Similarly, when tie bids occur, the
department has sufficient discretion under the Charter to choose a favored
supplier, although in fairness it should be stated that the department presently follows the practice of resolving ties by chance drawings. 75
Problems may also arise after the contract is awarded. Proper performance of the contract is most important. Both inspection of performance and the sanction of ensuing legal action are necessary checks assuring
the city that it is receiving what it has contracted for. That both these
functions are subject to administrative discretion is obvious. Hence, selfinterest on the part of the inspector or of persons who must subsequently
decide whether to proceed against defaulting suppliers or contractors, still
may stand to cause the city loss, regardless of the competitive bidding
system.
Accordingly, there appears to remain a need for conflict-of-interests
proscription as to those men who perform a function within the procurement system, the personnel in the several departments of the city govern74. "The Department may reject all bids if it shall deem it in the interest of the
City so to do." CHARTmR § 8-200(2) (b). The initial supervisory determination as
to whether a contractor is not a responsible bidder would be made by the Director
of Purchasing, Procurement Department. If the bidder should contest his status
the burden would, of course, be on him to initiate suit or contest administratively. In
New York, also, "all bids may be rejected." N.Y. SrArz FIN. LAw § 174.
75. The Procurement Department follows the practice of refusing to split an
award between tied low bidders. The award, in such a case, is determined by a draw
at which all tied bidders are permitted to be present. On the other hand, in the
award of contract where the price is regulated, such as with the state-determined
price of milk, the Mayor has followed the practice of splitting the contract between
the several competing suppliers. But the Charter itself does not dictate any procedure in the event of a tie bid. Thus it would not seem to be violative of the Charter
to select among tied low bidders on the basis of political affiliation or personal
favoritism, inasmuch as the city would not be the loser.
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ment whose duties involve the solicitation of bids, awarding of contracts,
inspection of performance, and enforcement of the city's legal contract
rights. To allow any person in control of what should be a check within
the system to retain self-interest may operate to defeat the system in its
entirety. To the extent, therefore, that the present legislation covers these
persons, it may be seen to have a reasonable basis; New York, too, retains
its conflicts ban as to such personnel.76 The remainder of its coverage,
however, can be justified only upon some theory other than immediate
self-dealing. In this regard, it is apparently fear of the exertion of intragovernmental influence upon those relatively few persons operating within
the procurement system itself which has seemed demanding.
Influencing as a Current Problem in Philadelphia
To what extent officials have exerted pressures on persons within the
procurement system to force a particular decision the authors were unable
to determine. They were informed, at least, that pressures had been
exerted on various members of the purchasing department by some city
officials, although they were assured that no partial action ever resulted.
The fact that such conduct may exist, however, does not solve the problem
of whether a broad ban on personal commercial interests of city personnel
is necessary. Inquiry must be narrowed to the question of whether the
fact of their holding public office significantly contributes to their ability
to effectuate those private interests. To properly analyze this question we
must first separate two classes of public government officials.
Officers such as the Mayor and Managing Director, because of their
direct supervision and appointive power over the personnel of the executive branch should properly be classified as possessing procurement-system
control and should be subject to the same legislative regulation. 77 Another
class comprises all those other officers and employees who have no direct
control over the procurement machinery. It may be seriously doubted
whether office-holders in this latter group have any influence whatever
over personnel in the procurement system by reason of their official posts.
76. "Neither the commissioner of standards and purchase nor any officer or
employee of the division of standards and purchase shall be financially interested or
have any personal beneficial interest either directly or indirectly in the purchase of
any materials, equipment or supplies under this article, nor in any firm, corporation,
partnership or association furnishing or bidding on any such materials and supplies."
N.Y. STATE Fix. LAW. § 174.
77. By the express terms of the Charter, the Mayor is made responsible for the

conduct of the executive and administrative work of the city. CHaRTm § 4-100. A
similar obligation devolves upon the Managing Director as far as all city departments

are concerned. CARTEm § 5-100. Thus, these officers will in most instances have
supervisory control over some aspect of a procurement transaction. To determine
what other persons come within the category of persons within the procurement
system it is necessary to look to the particular transaction involved. For example,
when the Department of Streets requests that new streets be built the Commissioner
of Streets and his subordinates become part of the procurement system for that transaction.

On the other hand, when for example the Fire Department requests some

purchase, the personnel of the Department of Streets are not part of the system for

that purchase.
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Any influence which they may in fact possess more likely springs from
their positions within their political party organizations. It must be remembered, moreover, that as regards the phenomenon of active interofficer pressuring, as contrasted with corruption of the decisional process
by the psychic biasing influence of the decider's own private interests, we
are more likely to be dealing with a knowing and calculated course of
perversion. While any wholly honest public official may by force of circumstance find himself in the typical conflicting-interests situation and so
be more victim than villain, the administrative persuader's more conscious
attempts to subvert governmental processes will often require no identifiable
conflicts situation to give them birth. Whether an officer will attempt to
exert influence upon others seems primarily a function of his general
character and integrity, rather than the nature of his specific private interests. Pressure may be brought to bear by this official in the interest of
relatives, associates, or the procurers of reciprocal favors, with as great adverse effect upon the public well-being as if the interests were his own.
The problem, then, is not one of keeping him out of the government because
his personal conflicting interests are likely to make difficult the properly
conscientious performance of his public duties, but because he is likely to
pervert performance of duty by others. And if it is true, as the authors
believe, that the ability of members of this class of civic officers to disserve
the public good derives not from their official positions but from power
otherwise acquired, there seems little reason for blanket conflict-of-interests
prohibition. It is suggested that the problem of influence, so defined, is one
concerned principally with the extent to which pressuring for private interests outside of accepted official channels of lobbying ought to be permitted
to any person, office-holder or civilian alike. The conduct is an evil, and
should be considered and regulated in itself.
Complete confusion of these two problem areas, however, appears
to obtain in the Philadelphia Charter provisions. The same two sections
which prohibit the retention of conflicting interests by public officials also
ordain that no councilman shall solicit any city contract, regardless of any
interest he may have in the contract, and that the remaining city officers
and employees subject to the Charter shall not "solicit any contract in which
they may have any . . . direct or indirect interest." 78 The word "solicit"
is nowhere defined and seems in context to apply, like a pun, with double
78. CHARTER § 10-102. The more stringent regulation of councilmen is found
in § 10-100. Just why such distinction was made does not appear in the draftsmen's
commentaries on the Charter. Persons interviewed have suggested that, prior to
the Charter, councilmen had been the prime offenders in soliciting contracts, either
for themselves or for constituents, and that a curb on this activity was deemed most
drastically needed at the time of drafting.
It may also be queried whether the ban upon "solicitation" of government contracts extends to managers or co-owners of private firms in which a municipal official
is "interested." If such interest is notorious, the reason of the rule seems to comprehend such a case; and non-inclusion would make for easy evasion of the rule.
But the terms of the Charter appear to apply only to public officers themselves. The
courts would perhaps be slow to attach the penal sanctions of the act to persons not
within its apparent immediate purview.
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meaning. Even aside from the dangerous ambiguities which inhere in such
statutory use, both possible meanings of the term appear to the present
authors inappropriate. If to solicit means to bring pressure to bear to
influence the partial award of a contract-this would be the case in which
councilmen might solicit contracts in which they had no personal interestthe evil aimed at seems to be that of illicit pressuring. But, as suggested
above, this evil is not restricted to mutual influencing among city officials,
but may arise as well wherever other personal or political-party affiliations
give a persuader the ascendant over the decision-making officer. As such,
it is a problem deserving of separate treatment and cannot be adequately
handled as a mere subordinate part of conflict-of-interests regulation. If,
on the other hand, to solicit means merely to offer, to make a bid-in this
sense a councilman might solicit a contract in which he had a personal
interest-then the solicitation provision is merely an extension of the
conflicting interest ban. Persons who have an interest in a government
contract are forbidden to hold public office; persons who hold public office
are forbidden to bid for government contracts. Assuming, then, our
conclusion that no legitimate justification exists for the conflict-of-interests
rule as applied to non-procurement personnel, clearly the "no-solicitation"
rule must also fall.
These conclusions should not be misunderstood as asserting that no
public harm may result from the retention of adverse pecuniary interests
by municipal personnel who are not directly a part of the procurement system. Without question, an ideal climate of government would be served
by having conflicts legislation apply to all public servants. It is recognized
that although acquisition of power to influence procurement personnel may
not in fact derive from the official positions of the influencers, perhaps
most of those who have gained positions of pressuring authority within
their respective political party organizations are also serving in government offices; and, to the extent that this correlation obtains, conflict-ofinterests legislation may indirectly achieve its end. It may also be admitted
that there will exist a fair degree of hesitancy on the part of those charged
with the duty to inspect performance and to enforce the legal rights of
the city, where proceedings must be taken against a fellow public official.
Some dangers do remain. In view, however, of the difficulty, on a
municipal level, of recruiting citizens of stature and ability who will also
be willing and able to forsake their commercial interests, and in view of
the limited power of public harm which is left to the interested official
by the institution of competitive bidding practices, the balance may more
favorably be struck by confining conflict-of-interests restrictions to those
officials within the procurement system itself. This would leave the problem of inter-official pressuring, along with non-official pressuring, to separate consideration and regulation.
One cautionary word must be added. The prestige which would
induce citizens to sacrifice personal interests for government position, the
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level of remuneration for public office and the number of qualified persons
available for public recruitment are significantly dissimilar at various levels
of government. The attention of this Note has been confined to the question of legislation appropriate to a municipality of some size. Resolution
of this problem would no doubt be different in the smaller municipal units
as well as in the state and federal governments. Regulation appropriate
for one may not with reason be transplanted to another. Each demands
its own study and 'evaluation, of which there has been precious little
at any level.
II. RESTRICTIONS ON PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS
IN REPRESENTNG OTHERS BEFORE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
In the preceding section attention was focused upon business and
financial interests of public officials that threaten to create conflict of interests in government contracting operations. In this section our attention turns to certain professional activities of public officials which may
give rise to similarly undesirable individual-government relations. A number of legislatures have evidenced a concern over the effect of these latter,
professional dealings, dealings in which the government officer may appear
in government proceedings at the behest of a private party. In general,
the legislation which has been enacted purports to restrict or sometimes
completely to prohibit government personnel from appearing in a representative capacity in matters pending before or involving agencies or departments of their governmental units.7 9 It seems fair to say that these
laws are in the main directed at the attorney in public office who maintains
some private practice, for it is in the nature of the legal profession to
"represent" clients and to handle matters concerning them before quasijudicial agencies or departments.
Several justifications for such legislation are given. First, there is
the notion that a person employed by the government owes fidelity to
that government and its interests, and that to side with the interests of
another in matters concerning the government is an unethical and disloyal act.80 Second, there is the fear that in order to assure success to
himself and benefit to his client, the official will use whatever power and
79. See statutes cited note 102 infra. Other legislation prohibits government
personnel from representing clients in judicial litigation adverse to the interest of the
government. See 18 U.S.C. §283 (1952); Nzw YORK, N.Y., Crr, CHAR=a §886.
While some of the reasons suggested for condemning practice by governmental officials
before the courts are similar to those for banning representation before government
administrative bodies, e.g., a notion of impropriety in acting adverse to the interests
of one's employer, the basic problem in that area appears to be the use of inside
information against the government and the fear that persons will search government
files for claims against the government and then solicit the owners of the claims to
represent them. See United States v. Adams, 115 F. Supp. 731 (D.N.D. 1953).
80. Interviews With Various City Officials and With Counsel for the Council
of New York City, S. Stanley Kreutzer, in New York City, October 24, 1958.
Mr. Kreutzer has drafted proposed amendments to the New York City Charter and
a proposed Code of Ethics for the City of New York which are currently being
considered for enactment there.
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prestige his public position offers to exert influence and pressure upon
the officials charged with deciding the matter.8 ' "Backscratching" is
offered as a possible evil, where officials may agree, expressly or impliedly,
to reciprocate favors done one another in the course of their official duties.
Third, there is fear that the mere presence of a public servant in a matter
may distill what might be called "tacit" influence: that although no active
force is exerted on the officials charged with deciding the issue, they,
through fears of potential retaliation, or being overly impressed by the
prestige of an official position, or by a desire to please a superior, or because they may entertain the hope of future reciprocal action by the representing official, or merely out of empathy, may in fact be influenced to
82
decide for the client of the public servant involved.
The chief objection to this type of legislation is that it acts as a deterrent to the enrollment of professionals, particularly attorneys, into the
public service. It is argued that the legislation aimed at curbing professional activities is more onerous than that designed to discourage business and other financial interests of public servants which may tend to
cause conflicts of interests. Monetary investment barred by conflict-ofinterests restrictions can, without undue hardship, be channeled into other
income producing activity; but an attorney cannot switch professions. And
legislation which cuts out an important portion of a legal practice can
result both in loss of income from the particular service and in loss of
clients, discouraged from retaining an attorney who is unable to afford
83
them complete legal representation.
As in the case of the legislation discussed in the earlier section of
this Note, the gravity of the deterrent force and the seriousness of its
impairment of adequate government recruitment differ at each governmental level. Proper analysis of the scope of restriction and regulation
necessary to strike an appropriate balance between the competing public
interests may only intelligently be made in the context of specific local
conditions. Our attention again centers on the Philadelphia situation.
The Proposed Philadelphia Ordinance
At present there is no legal objection to city employed personnel
privately appearing before the various municipal departments, boards or
81. See generally, State of New York, Special Legislative Comm. on Integrity
and Ethical Standards in Government, Report and Hearings,LEG. Doc. No. 39 (1954);
TEXAS LFGsLATnV CoUNCIL, A CODE OF ETHICS FOR STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES,
A REPORT TO THE 55TH LEGIsLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS 10-14 (1956) (hereinafter cited as TEXAS REPORT).
82. See TEXAS REPORT 10.
83. This concern was advanced in Interviews With the Draftsman of the New
York City Proposals, S. Stanley Kreutzer, supra note 80, and With the Draftsman
of the Philadelphia Proposal, City Solicitor David Berger, in Philadelphia, June 19,
1958. The reports of the commissions to study the conflicts problem in New York
State, New Jersey, and Honolulu, Hawaii, evidence throughout a similar concern.
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commissions. 8 4 It has in fact been the occasional practice of a number of
men holding positions with the city to appear in their unofficial capacity on
behalf of some private interest in matters before the several quasi-judicial
city boards. While instances were reported of such appearances in several
hearings before the Tax Review Board, the Board of License and Inspection Review and the Board of Revision of Taxes, the board most men-:
tioned by those interviewed was the Zoning Board of Adjustment. This
was due, it was suggested, to the usually greater monetary significance of
the decisions of the Zoning Board, and to the fact that the Board handles
more work than the others. Through its powers to grant variances and
exceptions to the zoning scheme the Board can permit land use which will
greatly increase property values.8 5 The positions of the men who appeared
included councilmen, assistant district attorneys, city department heads,
members of various city commissions and boards, and deputies and administrative assistants. In all reported instances the persons involved were
86
attorneys.
In view of this practice, two city councilmen recently requested the
City Solicitor to draft an ordinance to eliminate such appearances. 87 The
City Solicitor, who completely agreed with the councilmen as to the need
for such legislation, 8 proposed the following:
"No employee shall represent any other person with respect to any
matter pending before any body, department, agency, board or commission of the City, .

.

. nor shall partner or agent of an em-

ployee engage in such representation ...
"No member shall represent any other person with respect to any
matter pending before the body on which he serves nor shall a partner or agent of such member engage in such representation, except
that this shall not prohibit any member or his partner or agent
from such representation if such matter is uncontroverted or the action
is not determinative, provided that such member discloses his interest
and does not participate in the decision on the matter." 89
84. Article X of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter contains all the prohibited
activities of councilmen, city officers, employees and others. CHrEa §§ 10-100-10-111.
85. See Note, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 516 (1955).
86. The information concerning this practice was gathered by the authors during
the course of an interviewing process extending from June to October, 1958. Because
of the questionable nature of the conduct, it was decided to preface each interview
with the suggestion that the names of persons who have so engaged are irrelevant,
it being hoped that the person interviewed would feel less apprehensive in discussing
the matter. Only the city position of the persons who appeared was solicited. The
interviews were conducted in person or by telephone. Some instances were related
during informal discussions with city hall reporters and others who for political or

other reasons are almost fixtures at the city hall. It is significant that most of their
disclosures were hearsay. Because of the confidential nature of many of these sources,
it is deemed necessary to omit the names of the persons involved.
87. Interview With Councilman Samuel Rose in Philadelphia, June 15, 1958.
88. Interview With City Solicitor David Berger in Philadelphia, June 18, 1958.
89. Philadelphia Proposal §§ 3, 4.
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The essential distinction between "employee" and "member" is that
an "employee" is a paid city official, whether elected or appointed, while
a "member" is one who serves without compensation on an agency, board
or commission of the city.90 Apparently persons serving on boards and
commissions who receive per diem compensation, such as members of
the Tax Review Board and the Zoning Board of Adjustment, 9 are
classified as "employees" under the ordinance. Exceptions to coverage
are made if the "employee" is acting as a trustee or has a personal pro92
prietary interest in the matter.
The effect of enactment of this proposal upon an "employee" who
maintains a professional practice as sole practitioner would be to deprive
him of any opportunity to represent private clients before the city. If he
were a member of a partnership, inasmuch as his partners would also be
proscribed from appearing before city administrative bodies, the firm would
have either to give up this portion of its practice or to cause the city employee to withdraw from the partnership. On the other hand, perhaps
in recognition of the serious deterrence from public service visited upon
"employees,"'93 "members" would be permitted to appear freely before
boards other than their own, and even there when the matter before the
board is "uncontroverted or the action is not determinative."
These broad prohibitions of the bill have created a storm of controversy, particularly among members of the legal profession. Two committees of the Philadelphia Bar Association have undertaken to study the
bill, one from the point of view of its policy and probable effect on the legal
profession; 9 4 the other to appraise its draftsmanship.9 5 The bill itself
was referred to the city council's Committee on Law and Government and
is apparently there undergoing some revision.90
90. Philadelphia Proposal §§ I(a), (b).
91. The members of these boards were granted compensation by the City Council.
PHILADELPHIA, PA., ORDINANcEs 479, 515 (1953).
See note 26 supra.
92. Philadelphia Proposal §§3(a), (b). The exception to allow city employees
to advocate their own proprietary claims is interesting. In an interview with former
City Solicitor Abraham L. Freedman, the authors were informed of the perplexing
problem city officials are faced with when they have a personal claim against the city.
For instance. Mr. Freedman hypothesized the situation of a member of the city
solicitor's office having a grievance with his personal property assessment at the time
he was in office. He might fear however that the public might regard with distrust
any decision revising the assessment in his favor, inasmuch as his department would
be involved, and might therefore abandon any idea of pursuing what he nevertheless
felt was a valid claim. Interview With Abraham L. Freedman, in Philadelphia, Pa.,
June 18, 1958. The provision in question may, in this regard, offer a basis on which
to justify some such appearance, although a clearer measure concerned with this
problem could certainly be desired.
93. Interview With City Solicitor David Berger in Philadelphia, June 18, 1958.
94. Committee on Local Government, Jefferson B. Fordham, Dean, University
of Pennsylvania Law School, Chairman; Abraham L. Freedman, Subcommittee
Chairman.
95. Committee on Civil Legislation, Philip Sterling, Chairman; John Powers, Jr.,
Subcommittee Chairman.
96. Interview With Mr. Samuel Smith, June 11, 1958. Mr. Smith is the legislative
assistant to Councilman Tate.
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Comparison of the Philadelphia Proposal With Legislation
Enacted Elsewhere
While the majority of past and present city officers and employees
interviewed were of the opinion that some restriction of present practices
97
was justified, the consensus was that the Philadelphia bill went too far.
Since this proposed enactment is in fact more severe than existing legislation elsewhere, it might be helpful to first set out for comparison the several
current laws on the subject before proceeding to a more particular analysis
of the problem in Philadelphia. At least four jurisdictions, the federal
government," Pennsylvania,9 9 New York State 10 and New York City, 0 1
have enacted legislation specifically dealing with the representation problem.10 2 It is apparent that the enactments differ as to the kind and amount
97. The information was gathered in interviews with present and past city officials
and employees and many practicing attorneys in Philadelphia during a period between

June and October 1958.
98. 18 U.S.C. §281 (1952).
99. PA. STAT. ANxr. tit. 71, § 776.7 (Supp. 1958).
100. N.Y. PuB. OFcERs LAw § 73(2).

101. NEW YORK, N.Y., CITY CHARTER § 886(b).
102. The practice is attacked at the federal level in the broad wording of § 281
of title 18 U.S.C., which provides: "Whoever, being a [Congressman, officer, or
employee] of the United States or any department or agency thereof, directly or
indirectly receives or agrees to receive, any compensation for any services rendered
or to be rendered, either by himself or another, in relation to any . . . matter in

which the United States is a party or directly or indirectly interested, before any
department, agency, court martial, officer or any civil, military or naval commission
[shall be fined or imprisoned]. "
At the state level, New York and Pennsylvania have enacted recent legislation.
The New York act, modeled in some regards upon the federal law, provides: "No
officer or employee of a state agency, member of the legislature or legislative em-

ployee shall receive, or enter into any agreement express or implied for, compensation
for services to be rendered in relation to any . . . matter before any state agency,
whereby his compensation is to be dependent or contingent upon any action by such
agency . . . provided, however, that nothing in this subdivision shall be deemed
to prohibit the fixing at any time of fees based upon the reasonable value of the
services rendered." N.Y. PuB. OFFICERS LAW § 73(2). The Pennsylvania provision
is shorter. It provides: "No State employe, except in the performance of his duties
as such employe, shall, for remuneration, directly or indirectly, represent any other
person upon any matter pending before or involving any State agency." PA. STAT.
AxNx. tit. 71, §776.7 (Supp. 1958).
Finally, New York City, by its charter, provides: "No councilman or other paid
officer or employee of the city or of any agency . . . shall, during his employment
or incumbency, . . . appear as attorney or counsel before any [city] agency . . ."
NEw YORE, N.Y., CITy CHARTER § 886(b).

It is clear from the statutes themselves and their respective definitions of "agency"
that the prohibitions apply to representation in matters involving all forms of executive
and administrative action (including quasi-judicial action) that fall within the jurisdiction of the enacting body. The federal statute concerns itself with matters "before
any department, agency, court martial, officer or any civil, military or naval commission." 18 U.S.C. § 281 (1952). The definitions given to the term "state agency"
under the New York State and Pennsylvania acts are equally inclusive. N.Y. PuB.
OF IcERs LAw § 73(1) provides: "The term 'state agency' shall mean any State
department, or division, board, commission, or bureau of any state department." State
agency is defined under the Pennsylvania act as: "A department, board, commission
or other part of the executive branch of the government of the Commonvealth or the
Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, the General State Authority or other State
authority, created by a statute which declares in substance that such authority per-
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of conduct which they purport to prohibit, ranging from a ban only upon
contingent fee practice to the blanket proscription of all officer appearance.
Such variance suggests a difference of opinion among the respective legislative bodies as to what kinds of conduct were most harmful, or, at least,
as to where the principal harm of the conduct lay.
The New York State act condemns government officer representation
of private interests before state administrative agencies only if it is compensated on a contingent fee basis, and expressly allows that such services
may be rendered for a reasonable fee.loa Necessarily, New York must
be of the view that there is nothing inherently improper in state personnel
taking matters before state boards in a private capacity. Moreover, the
New York legislature was apparently not concerned with the possibility of
"tacit" influence upon executive or administrative decisions. Presumably,
the only danger it regarded was that a servant of the state might be motivated to exert actual, express influence behind the scenes when compensation for his services was contingent upon success in the affair.
The prohibitions of both the federal and Pennsylvania statutes are
broader. Under the federal act, representation becomes illegal upon the
receipt of "any compensation." 104 The Pennsylvania act, by forbidding
representation "for remuneration," similarly distinguishes between paid and
unpaid appearances. 0 5 Apparently the attitude of both jurisdictions is that
any element of remuneration, contingent or pre-fixed, acts as an incentive
to exert official influence. 10 6 As in New York, presumably neither jurisforms or has for its purpose the performance of an essential governmental function
and that its bonds shall not pledge the full faith or credit or be obligations of the
Commonwealth." PA. STAT. AN. tit 71, § 776.2(1) (Supp. 1958). "Agency" as
used in the New York City charter provision means: "[A] city, county, borough or
other office, position, department, division, bureau, board or commission, or a corporation, institution, or agency of the government, the expenses of which are paid in whole
or in part from the city treasury." Nmv YoRx, N.Y., Crry CHARnrm § 981 (2). The
federal act provides for a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more
than two years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 281 (1952). Both Pennsylvania and New York
make violations of the acts misdemeanors. See N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1878; PA. STAT.
Ax. tit. 71, § 776.8 (Supp. 1958). Violations of the New York City charter provision constitutes cause for dismissal. NEw YoRa, N.Y., Cry CiARTER § 886 (c).
103. See N.Y. PuR. OmvcEs LAW § 73(2), quoted note 102 supra.
104. See 18 U.S.C. §281 (1952), quoted note 102. m.pra. But note that the
federal act, unlike the state statutes, limits the ban to matters "in which the United
States is a party or directly or indirectly interested."
105. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 776.7 (Supp. 1958), quoted note 102 supra.
106. These four statutes are analyzed in text only from the point of view of the
conduct expressly indicted. It should be noted, however, that additional elements
may be superimposed by the courts as requisite to making out an offense under the
acts. The federal, New York State and Pennsylvania acts are criminal. See note
102 supra. The question may be raised whether a showing of a corrupt intent is
necessary to violate the acts. Although this problem as to the New York State
and Pennsylvania statutes has not yet been before the courts, the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia has had to face the question under § 281 of the federal
act. In May v. United States, 175 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1949), Congressman May had
received substantial sums from his co-defendants for services rendered in negotiating
contracts and other matters between the War Department and those co-defendants.
In a prosecution under § 203 of title 18 (now § 281), May defended on the grounds
that the contracts were necessary for the war effort, and that his actions in the
matter were of a true patriotic intent. Id. at 1006. The court dismissed this con-
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diction fears the possibility of "tacit" influence or believes that an appearance in a private capacity is per se disloyal or unethical.
The extreme position is taken by New York City in its charter and
by the proposed city ordinance in Philadelphia. They respectively forbid
city servants to "appear as attorney or counsel" 107 or to "represent" 108
tention, holding that the gist of the offense was the receipt of compensation, and the
nature of the services involved was immaterial.
The May case was decided in 1949. In 1956 the District Court for the Southern
District of New York handed down its opinion in United States v. Quinn, 141 F.
Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). Quinn was prosecuted under §281 for receiving from
his law partners funds that had been earned from services performed by those partners
before the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Of interest here is that the district court
held that the government had to show "that the compensation was received in return
for services rendered for the purpose of interceding with, or with intent to influence
and persuade, officers and employees of the Internal Revenue Bureau to obtain favorable decisions and actions in matters pending before the bureau." Id. at 626-27.
Through oversight or disregard, the Quinn opinion fails to mention the court of
appeals decision in May. The motion to quash the indictment was granted in part
because of insufficient evidence that Quinn had such an intent.
The government averred in the indictment against Quinn that it was his purpose
in'receiving the money to so influence the members of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Id. at 629. Technically therefore it was part of the government's case to prove this
intent. Dictum in the opinion clearly asserts however that even without this allegation, a showing that the accused received compensation for the purpose of influencing
the officials was a necessary element of the governments case.
If the view of the Quinn court is followed, it would not be illegal for those persons
who fall within the coverage of the federal act to appear before the several executive
agencies and departments for a fee, provided their intent in so acting is bona fide.
Under such a view, whatever tacit influencing power may attach to the prestige of an
official's position cannot be curbed by invocation of the statute. Moreover, the government is put to the difficult burden of producing the sort of evidence that will sufficiently
raise an inference of corrupting intent. The showing of a disproportionately large
fee would be indicative, but probably not conclusive. Discoverable direct evidence
of such evil intention would in the normal course of things be oral, consisting exclusively of conversation over the telephone or in the seclusion of offices. See May v.
United States, supra at 1009. Unless those persons approached by the official want
to disclose and testify, it would seem that ordinarily infraction would remain undiscovered. Under the May decision, on the other hand, the proof problem is greatly
reduced. Proof of the appearance itself is of course immediately accessible. And
evidence of receipt of compensation, in the form of canceled checks, bank statements,
tax returns and the like, should ordinarily be available. Moreover, since the effect
of May is to prevent all appearances, psychic influences attributable to appearance
itself are removed.
Whether the May view or the Quinn view should be followed will ultimately
involve decision upon the basic question of how much one wants to cut down on the
professional activities of all government personnel, which in turn depends upon one's
view of what constitutes the danger of such activities. If one accepts the premise
that appearance itself will, by way of psychic aura attaching to a public official,
influence the decision-making process to the public detriment, May alone is tenable.
If, however, it is only active corruptive pressuring of which one is afraid, acceptance
of May will depend upon a determination as to whether there is sufficient statistical
justification in curtailing the activities of all honest personnel in order to prevent
some unscrupulous employees from using their official positions for their private
enrichment. This determination itself requires weighing of the difficulties of proof
that arise in the application of Quinn as against the loss to the government of those
competent and scrupulous men who cannot suffer the sacrifices to their business or
profession that the broad deterrent policy of May imposes. It is submitted that, on
balance, the May decisison provides a more desirable approach. If it should develop
that its application does in fact impractically hamper government personnel enrollment, legislative relief at the instance of the powerful agency lobbies should not be
long in coming.
107. See note 102 upra.
108. Philadelphia Proposal § 3 cited in text accompanying note 89 supra.
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persons before city departments or agencies, without regard to whether a
fee is involved. By completely eliminating officer appearances the potential
danger of "tacit" influence is removed as well as all incentive to the exertion
of actual pressure through official position. It was this absolute prohibition
of appearance in the Philadelphia proposal which was the feature most
frequently objected to by the attorneys interviewed. As regards two situations especially, it was said, the proscription becomes an unwarranted,
onerous burden upon the ability of a city employee to maintain a private
practice at law. Frequently counsel may specialize in transactions which
only incidentally or unexpectedly involve appearance before municipal
administrative agencies: The affairs of mercantile corporations, for example, while predominantly unconcerned with municipal regulation, may
at times present problems which call for appeal to the Tax Review Board.
The other situation involves the client of long standing who for the nonce
has some unusual call for appearance before one of the municipal agencies.
In either case many of the attorneys interviewed would be more than
willing to provide their services without immediate remuneration, for the
"good will" involved. This would clearly be permissible under the "contingent" fee standard of the New York law, and probably acceptable in
most cases under the federal and Pennsylvania statutes.
In the absence of any dependable psychological data, the question of
whether receipt of a fee has substantial relation to predictable motivation,
either to win a cause or to resort to illicit pressuring in the winning of it,
is difficult of solution. It is the authors' view that if monetary reward
is considered a sufficiently persuasive inducement to the exertion of express
influence through extra-official channels by public officials, whether that
reward is immediate in the form of an agreed fee or postponed as implicit
in the rendition of services for "good will' is likely to be relatively insignificant. And even when we have put aside all considerations of possible
overt pressuring, or of "disloyalty" or "impropriety" in the ethical sense,
as over-balanced by the hardship on city-employed attorneys who, because
of their limited governmental remuneration, must maintain private practices, the dangers of the ubiquitous and unavoidable "tacit influence" may
still remain. The effect of such influence in favor of the official-represented
client, although suspected by many, is impossible of accurate ascertainment.
As might be expected, members of the various quasi-judicial city boards
who were interviewed denied its existence. If anything, they pointed out,
when an official appeared before them they leaned the other way, in counterfavoritism, so as to avoid any suspicion that they were partial toward
the official. It is submitted that either position provides the same reason
to prohibit completely the practice of officer representation of persons before the city boards, departments and agencies. Private parties should be
protected from the tactical ineptness, as well as from the corruption of
counsel. It is an evil to jeopardize the impartiality of a deciding official
in any manner, pro or con; to subject him to alternatives of being sus-

1012

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107

pected of partiality or of being subconsciously influenced is itself an interference with the proper administration of government. While, admittedly,
prohibition will be burdensome to honest city officials in pursuit of their
professions, the evils attributed to officer appearance as private counsel
seem to militate against permitting such appearance even on a "good will"
basis. 109
Representation by Partners of City Officials
Under the proposed Philadelphia ordinance partners and agents of
city officials are also forbidden to represent private persons before the
various city agencies and departments on the theory that what a person
may not do directly he may not do indirectly." 0 Presumably, too, the city
official will benefit from the services rendered by his agent or partner, and
hence may still be motivated to exert his influence to gain a favorable
decision.
Although the New York City charter provisions do not expressly
extend their ban beyond appearance of the government official himself,
private representation before administrative agencies by partners and agents
of an official are also included within the purview of the federal, New York
State and Pennsylvania acts. Under section 281 of the federal act a government official is forbidden to receive compensation from services rendered in matters before the federal agencies and departments whether performed by himself "or another." "- Thus if his agent or partner engages
in such conduct and the official receives a portion of the fee earned he
violates the act. 1 2 Similar results would obtain under the Pennsylvania
109. Where the public official does not come into direct contact with the various

departments or agencies in the course of a particular private employment, the vari-

ation in terminology among the acts produces significantly different results. Suppose,
for example, an attorney employed by a government agency is offered a reasonable fee

to write a memorandum of law in preparation for a brief to be filed in a matter
pending before another agency of the same government. It is reasonably clear that
he could not accept were he employed by the federal government, for the fee would
constitute compensation for a service rendered in relation to a matter before an agency.
Since the fee is reasonable, he could without question accept under the New York
State act. But under the Pennsylvania and New York City provisions, the determinative question would be whether such conduct amounts to "representing" or
"appearing" respectively within the meaning of those acts. It would seem that it
does not fall within the popular meaning of these terms: "appearing" connotes a
coming into view in a physical sense while "representing" suggests the standing or
speaking on behalf of another (here the attorney who offers the job and who finally
writes the brief seems rather the person who "represents" in the matter before the
agency). Whether the courts will give extension to these words beyond their popular
meaning will to some extent depend upon what they deem to be the purpose of the
enactments. Once it is accepted that this purpose is solely to prevent undue influence,
either by active exertion of persuading pressure or by what we have called tacit
influence, there seems little reason to define these terms so as to encompass the memodrafting situation. So long as the attorney-official's name is not called to the attention of the agency in connection with the proceeding, his legal services are not of a
sort to raise any of the dangers which it was the supposed purpose of the acts to
repress.
110. Interview With City Solicitor David Berger in Philadelphia, June 18, 1958.
111. See 18 U.S.C. § 281 (1952), quoted note 102 supra.
112. Whether or not the government-employed partner must know that part of
his share of the partnership profits are derived from services rendered by members of
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statute which prohibits state employees from "indirectly representing"
persons for remuneration. 1 3 While the prohibiting clause of the New
the firm before government agencies is an important problem in view of the penal
nature of the act. See note 102 supra. United States v. Quinn, 141 F. Supp. 622
(S.D.N.Y. 1956), discussed previously at note 106 supra, in connection with the determination of whether a showing of intent to influence executive action is necessary
in a prosecution under the federal statute, serves to illustrate also the problem of
scienter as to source of funds. Quinn was a member of the House of Representatives
during a period in which his law partners represented clients in matters before the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. Save for one instance Quinn never personally appeared
or rendered any services in these matters. None of the clients so represented retained
Quinn individually, nor did they meet him nor in general have any contact with him.
His tax returns evidenced that he still received a share of partnership proceeds
although he was inactive in partnership affairs during his incumbency. Quinn was
indicted under §281 for having received compensation for services rendered before
a federal agency "by another". His two partners were indicted as aiders and abettors.
The trial court held that (in addition to the intent requirement) the government
had to show "that Quinn knowingly accepted the compensation for the services which
he knew had been rendered in matters before the Internal Revenue Bureau during the
period he was a member of Congress." Id. at 626. Holding the evidence insufficient
to support the requisite finding, the court granted a motion to dismiss the indictment.
Necessarily, the indictments against his partners as alders and abettors were also

dismissed.
In view of the fact that it does not appear on the face of § 281 that knowledge on
the part of the government-employed partner is a requisite element for conviction,
it would seem that the court must have found a controlling congressional intent to
make it such. The opinion however does not articulate this approach. In any event
a requirement of knowledge would appear to be the key to whether complete abstinence from partnership profits resulting from services before government agencies
will in fact be required under the federal act. Presumably, if a firm adopts the
policy, and in effect makes a practice of keeping their government partner in the
dark about any business before the government, or that certain amounts of his partnership share were earned from such practice, the government partner can continue to
draw his share without violation of §281. This was in essence what the court felt
had happened in the Quinn case. The argument in favor of this construction of the
federal act is that if the act is designed to prevent a government employee from
exerting the force of his position to his own advantage, there is no danger when he
has no knowledge that he can benefit himself. Note, however, that under this construction partners of the official may, without fear of adverse consequences, use his
name without his knowledge so as to capitalize on whatever influence it may bear
with the various agencies and other branches of the government. And where actual
knowledge is required, there is again a difficult problem of proof. It would seem
that here too, even more perhaps than in proof of intent to influence (see note 109
mipra), most of the relevant evidence will ordinarily lie within the exclusive knowledge
and control of those persons who would be defendants in the prosecution, either as
principal violators, or as aiders and abettors. Such considerations apparently did not
bother the Quin court. That court was probably correct in refusing to impute guilty
knowledge by use of the doctrine that the knowledge of one partner is knowledge
of all, since fictions invented to achieve desired substantive results in civil litigation
ought not be made the basis of criminal liability. But the court seems to tread
shakier ground in refusing to charge Quinn with the requisite knowledge on the theory
that it would have been unreasonable for him not to expect that his partners would
not give up their established practice before the Bureau of Internal Revenue. To
demand more than such circumstantial evidence of knowledge may make the act
unenforceable. Because of the nearly impossible burden of proving knowledge, it
seems more reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend that actual knowledge
be an element of the offense, particularly inasmuch as no such requirement appears
on the face of the act. Moreover, the prophylactic, rather than punitive, aim of the
legislation, militates against the judicial reading in of scienter. To make deterrence
more complete, a construction which requires evidence only of services performed by
the firm before an agency, and of receipt by the government partner of a part of
the firm's fee, seems most practically sound.
113. See note 102 supra. Accord, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Official
Opinion No. 22, Oct. 16, 1957.
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York State act does not contain any language that pertains to action by
agents or partners," 4 the final clause in the act provides:
"Nothing [contained in this act] shall be construed to prohibit any firm
or association, in which [any person subject to the act] is a member,
from appearing, rendering services in relation to any matter before
*

.

a state agency, where [such person subject to the act] does not

share in the profits resulting therefrom." 115
The clause is unfortunately vague. Since the major operative provisions
of the act are directed toward conduct of the government official himself,
while this clause speaks in terms of prohibiting "any firm or association,"
it is not entirely clear whether the appearing partners are meant to be also
subject to penal sanctions or whether their conduct will visit liability upon
the public servant alone. Furthermore, since the official himself is prohibited from making appearances only when his remuneration is contingent
upon success, there is considerable question as to whether the partner's
fee must be similarly conditioned. Finally, it should be noted that the
statute merely directs that no violation shall be found when the person
subject to the act receives no share of the profits derived by his partner's
activity before a state agency; it does not definitely indicate that criminal
sanctions are always to flow from the converse situation. At the very
least, however, it may be said that a legislative intention is here manifested
to permit a partnership to which a state official belongs to practice freely
before the state agencies so long as the pecuniary fruits of the activity
are channeled away from the government member.
Each of these enactments, then, appears to make receipt of part
of the fees earned by the partner or agent a necessary element in the offense.
Again, the legislatures seem intent upon suppressing possible pecuniary interests which may encourage an official to go behind the scenes to pressure
for favorable results. The effect of the legislation, however, is not invariably to force the partner entering public service to retire from the
firm. Technically, two partnerships might be created among the members
of the association for purposes of accounting. The second entity would
exclude the member who is in public service. When the firm becomes
engaged in a matter involving the government, it is the second partnership
which handles the case and accepts the compensation. Thus no illegal benefit would accrue to the publicly employed partner, while he may continue
to enjoy his distributive share of all other income of the association.
The Philadelphia proposal, on the other hand, by its explicit condemnation of partners practicing before the city, suggests an intention to preclude
any arrangement which might allow an attorney entering the public service
to retain active connections with a firm to which he has belonged and which
114. See note 102 supra.
115. N.Y. Pun. OFFIrCRs LAW § 73(6).

(Emphasis added.)
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may handle proceedings before the city boards. However, it might be
argued that as a "partnership" is a flexible legal concept, were income
derived from practice before the municipal agencies to be channeled away
from the government member, he would not be deemed a "partner" for this
purpose. In an analogous situation, for example, suppose that a government employee were associated with two other persons, one of whom was
an attorney, in a partnership for the conduct of some non-legal enterprise.
It is unlikely that the draftsman of the Philadelphia legislation intend to
preclude the attorney-partner in this position from practicing before the
city. Yet there would appear to be no greater association, for the particular purpose of practicing before the city agencies, where all the partners
are attorneys and the business of the firm is practice of law, so long as,
here also, scrupulous separation is observed between agency practice and
non-agency practice. Thus, it would not be altogether surprising were the
courts to interpret the proposed Philadelphia ordinance in a manner similar
to that in which the state legislation may be read, so as to permit the
creation of "second partnerships" for the purpose of avoiding the law's
proscription. On the other hand, because of the explicit wording of the
ordinance in comparison to the "indirect remuneration" language of the
comparable acts, and because of the practical difficulty of assuring, in the
all-attorney office, that proceeds from agency practice do not in fact arrive
in the hands of the officer-partner (consider the problem of allocation where
the firm is on retainer for a client only a small portion of whose affairs
involves appearance before city agencies), the danger exists that at least
partners for the practice of law will be subject to the ban of the proposed
provision, with the courts developing a flexible doctrine to exclude partners
for other business purposes.
It is submitted that such stringent regulation is unreasonable and undesirable. While some element of "tacit" influence may be present when
a partner of a government official appears before one of the municipal
agencies, it is necessarily more limited than that resulting from the appearance of the official himself. The deciding administrator must first associate
the counsel with the public officer, and, secondly, assume an interest in the
outcome of the case on the part of that officer. The tenuous character of
such a psychic process suggests that it is probably unnecessary to impose
upon practicing partners the onerous burdens of the proposed ordinance.
So far as the problem of possible active persuading pressure by the officer
partner, the less severe no-compensation provisions of the state and federal statutes, by withdrawal of the immediate profit motive, appear to
reduce temptation as effectively as a requirement of complete non-association. There remains, of course, the potentially corrupting motive of desire
to advance the long-term interests of the firm of which the officer is a partner, but this motive is in any event inexorable, inasmuch as most attorneys
entering public service probably anticipate returning to their firms upon the
termination of their incumbency.
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Persons Serving Without Compensation
Under the Philadelphia proposal paid "employees" of the city, whether
elected or appointed, full or part-time-and their partners or agents-are
subject to the act. Three of the four existing enactments considered have
similar coverage. 116 The Pennsylvania statute, however, curiously excludes
i
from its scope all officers and employees of the legislative branch. 17
The important question to be determined is whether persons who serve
the government without compensation should be subject to the coverage of
the acts. It is here, where public officials depend entirely for livelihood
upon non-public compensation, that the deterrent effect upon municipal
personnel recruitment of restricting certain sources of income would be
most severely felt. Both the New York City charter provision and the
Pennsylvania act exclude in express terms persons serving without compensation."i 8 The New York State act and the federal provision, on the
other hand, use only the categorical terms "officers" and "employees" without any express distinction between paid and unpaid persons." 9 Unfortunately there are no judicial decisions or administrative opinions discussing
this aspect of either of the latter acts. It is perhaps less significant under
the New York State provision whether or not such persons are included
because in any event they will not be barred from practicing for a reasonable fee.
There is some authority that persons serving without compensation
are included within the meaning of the terms "officers" and "employees"
under the federal act. This conclusion is reached upon examination of
other federal statutes calling in specific instances for the appointment of
persons to serve without compensation other than expenses incurred.
These statutes provide either that persons appointed under them are ipso
facto exempted from the coverage of section 281, or that they may be
exempted if the President so orders.' 20 The necessary implication of
such provisions is that the Congress deems such persons subject to section
281 unless exemptions are expressly provided for.
116. See note 102 supra.
117. PA. STAT. Axw. fit. 71, § 776.2(4) (Supp. 1958).
118. Nmv Yoiu, N.Y., Crr CHARTF § 886(b) covers only "paid" officers or
employees. See note 102 supra. The Pennsylvania act provides similarly. A state
employee is defined as "an appointed officer or employee in the service of a State
agency, and who receives a salary or wage for such service." PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 71,
7762(4) (Supp. 1958).
119. See statutes quoted note 102 supra.
120. For instance, § 710(b) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, 63 Stat. 798,
50 U.S.C. §§ 2061-166 (1952) provides that the President, in procuring "persons of outstanding experience and ability without compensation" in order to carry out the
provisions of the act, can "provide by regulation for the exemption of such persons
from the operations of 281, 283, 284 . . . of title 18 of the United States Code.
"
See also 63 Stat. 439 (1949), 12 U.S.C. § 1701(h) (1952) providing that service on
an advisory committee to an agency of the Housing and Home Finance Agency
"shall not constitute any form of service, employment, or action within the provisions
of section 281 . ..

."
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Philadelphia's proposed enactment, following the New York City and

Pennsylvania examples, has expressly exempted from its broad no-practice
restrictions the unpaid appointees to city boards and commissions. Under
the Charter, members of these bodies currently serve without compensa-

tion unless the city council has otherwise provided. 121 The proposal
would prohibit appearance of "members" receiving no compensation only
in certain classes of matters pending before their own agencies; 122 otherwise the freedom of such members, and of their agents and partners, remains unhampered. Thus small obstruction is opposed to the task of
the Mayor, as appointing officer, in recruiting persons of stature and competence to serve without compensation.
It is questionable, however, whether this dichotomy between paid
and unpaid members of boards and commissions takes sufficiently into
account the dangers inherent in the officer appearance problem. Within
the structure of the city government, as established by the Charter, the
various boards and commissions, although they may not demand the fulltime services of their members, nevertheless are charged with extremely
important administrative and quasi-judicial functions. 123 Significantly
valuable private interests are daily affected by their decisions. Members
of the quasi-judicial boards especially, then, many of whom are presently
practicing attorneys, 124 are in an excellent position to demand, or at least
to anticipate, the reciprocation of favors before each other's boards.
Presently, members of the Zoning Board and Tax Review Board receive
per diem wages,'2 and hence would be subject to entire prohibition of
private appearance under the act. On the other hand, members of the
Board of License and Inspection Review, presently uncompensated, 126 are
excluded from this prohibition even though they in fact present the same
problem. It is submitted that all members serving on a quasi-judicial body
should be included within the ban regardless of whether or not they receive
pay. Neither the menace of corruption through "backscratching" 127 nor
the more subtle danger of psychic pressuring through prestige can be
wholly ignored, and the same considerations which make it inadvisable for
judges of the regular courts to appear professionaly before one another
seem here apposite. It is recognized that such a restriction may make recruitment of practicing attorneys for unpaid positions somewhat more
121. CHARTam

§ 3-601.

122. See text accompanying notes 90-91 supra.
123. BUREAU OF MuxIcIPAL 'RESEARcH

(EASTERN DmsioN),

PHn.ADnEPHIA

& PENNSYLVANIA

GOVERM ENT 29-30 (1956).

EcoNo

y LEAGUE

124. Currently, three of the five members of the Zoning Board of Adjustment,
three of five members of the Tax Review Board, and three of seven members of the
Board of License and Inspection Review are practicing attorneys.
125. See note 26 .rra.
126. Interview With Joseph E. Riley, Esq., Chairman, Board of License and
Inspection Review, in Philadelphia, Pa., Oct. 22, 1958.
127. A member of one of the city boards (who felt there was no impropriety in
taking matters before other boards) informed the authors that one of the reasons
he accepted his official post was that he felt he would receive "better service on his
accounts" if he mentioned his position in dealings with the city.
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difficult than at present. It may be queried, however, whether the difficulty of attracting competent personnel to the uncompensated boards would,
in case of extension of the ban, be any greater than the difficulty which the
drafters of the current proposal are apparently willing to undergo as
regards those sporadically-meeting boards whose members receive only per
diem remuneration. At any rate, the evils which may result from the
absence of regulation, and which are no less grave in the case of unpaid
than of paid administrators, appear significantly to outweigh the potentially increased burden upon procurement of volunteer personnel. If
recruitment, in actual practice, shows itself hampered, payment of some
public remuneration may be demanded. It has been suggested as an alternative that, since the workload of many of these uncompensated agencies
is relatively slight, they might be staffed by members of the city solicitor's
and comptroller's offices. On the other hand, as to unpaid members of
boards and commissions which are not quasi-judicial in nature, the restrictions might logically be relaxed.
In brief conclusion, then, it is believed that the presently permitted
practice of appearance before city boards and commissions by city officials
acting in a private representative capacity creates a danger of prejudiced
decision inimical to the proper administration of government. Despite the
recognized potential increment in difficulty of recruitment of officials under
a no-appearance ordinance, such a ban, both as to paid city administrators
and as to unpaid members of quasi-judicial boards, seems demanded.
While the appearance of partners of these persons may at times raise similar
problems, the dangers of perversion are deemed sufficiently reduced if the
city-employed partner is financially dissociated from his firm's agency
practice. To demand complete divorcement from the partnership appears
a more severe remedy than the evil requires, and one calculated unjustifiably
to deter enrollment in the public service.
III. CODES OF ETHICS

Attempting to supplement piecemeal criminal conflicts legislation,
recent statutory pronouncement in the conflict-of-interests area has taken
the form of comprehensive codes of ethics. Presently, the States of New
York 128 and Texas 12 have such codes on their books, while measures
in New Jersey, 13 0 New York City, 1 1- and Honolulu, Hawaii 132 are pend128. N.Y. Pun. OFFIcEas LAW § 74.
129. Tzx. REV. Cxv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9 (Supp. 1958).

130. The state senate has created the Commission to Study the Subject of Conflicts in the Performance of Public Duties by Persons Holding Public Office, Position
or Employment With Their Personal, Business or Professional Interests, by Senate
Concurrent Resolution No. 18, 1956, since reconstituted by Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 9, 1957, New Jersey.
131. Proposed Amendment to § 886, Nzv YoRx, N.Y., CIrv CHAR= (hereinafter
cited as New York City Charter Proposal); Proposed Amendment to Nzw YoRx,
N.Y., ADMINISTRATIV CODE § 1, ch. 40, § B (hereinafter cited as New York City Code
Proposal) ; announced Feb. 3, 1959, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1959, § C, p. 22, col. 1.
132. Proposed Ordinance, City of Honolulu, Hawaii, 1958 (hereinafter cited
as Honolulu Proposal).
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ing. Other cities, such as Philadelphia, 3 3 Arlington, 34 and Los Angeles 135
have considered enactments of such a nature, but apparently no official
action has resulted from the proposals.
The approach of the codes is to declare what are to be considered
acceptable standards of conduct by public officials. Each rule or principle
announced contemplates a general situation which the lawmakers deem
departs from the proper moral climate of government. Some flavor of
the nature of these provisions may be obtained by considering the following
principles, each selected from one or another of the codes, but which appears
in substantially similar language in most of the others:
(1) "[No public official shall] engage in any business or transaction or . . . have a financial or other private interest, direct or
indirect, which is in conflict with the proper discharge of his official
duties." 136
(2) "[No public official] may accept any gift, favor or service
that might reasonably tend to influence him in the discharge of his
official duties." 137
(3) "[Public officials] should not use confidential information obtained in the course of their public duties for their own private
gain, nor should they disclose such information to others who could
benefit from such disclosures." 138
(4) "[No public official] should use or attempt to use his official
position to secure unwarranted privileges or exemptions for himself
or others." 139
In addition, some codes include a specific rule against public officials representing private persons before governmental agencies. 140 Some provide
expressly that an official should not accept present or future employment
with persons with whom he is currently dealing officially, or with whom
133. Proposed Ordinance, City of Philadelphia, Pa., Aug. 24, 1955 (hereinafter
cited as Philadelphia Code).
134. Report of the Citizens' Committee on Ethics in Government, Arlington,
Virginia, Aug. 15, 1952 (hereinafter cited as Arlington Proposal).
135. Proposed Ordinance, City of Los Angeles, Cal. (hereinafter cited as Los
Angeles Proposal).

136. New York City Code Proposal § 1, ch. 40, § 898.1-0(a). See also N.Y. Pus.

OrFicEms LA-v § 74(2) ; TEx. REv. Cirv. STAT. AN. art. 6252-9 § 3(h) (Supp. 1958);

Honolulu Proposal § 2(a) (6); Los Angeles Proposal; Philadelphia Code § 1.
137. Honolulu Proposal §2(a) (1).

See also Tax. REv. Crv.

STAT.

ANN. art.

6252-9 § 3(a) (Supp. 1958) ; Los Angeles Proposal; New York City Code Proposal
§ 1, ch. 40, § 898.1-0(f) ; Philadelphia Code § 6.
138. Philadelphia Code § 4. See also N.Y. PuB. OmrtcERs LAw § 74(3) (c);
TEx. REv. STAT. Civ. AxN. art. 6252-9(3) (e) (Supp. 1958) ; Los Angeles Proposal;
New York City Code Proposal § 1, ch. 40, § 898.1-0(g) ; Honolulu Proposal § 2(a) (3).
139. N.Y. PuB. OFFicERs LAW § 74(3) (d). See also Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. Axx.
art. 6252-9 § 3(c) (Supp. 1958) ; Honolulu Proposal § 2(a) (2) ; Los Angeles Proposal; Philadelphia Code § 3.
140. New York City Code Proposal § 1, eh. 40, § 898.1-0(b) ; Philadelphia Code § 5.
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he might deal officially. 14 ' Others are satisfied to charge the official gen142
erally to conduct himself in a manner befitting his public office.
Essentially, the codes recognize conflict-of-interests for what it is:
both a problem in individual morals and ethics and a problem in the proper
administration of government. They appeal primarily to the dignity of the
public official, telling him that it is considered improper to allow himself
to be in a position where his independence of judgment will be jeopardized.
None contain penal provisions. Instead, breach of the codes is made
143
grounds for disciplinary action or for discharge or removal from office.
One draftsman comments that the absence of penal provisions and of consequent criminal stigma in the codes may improve the possibility of their
enforcement, since it is felt that a great number of infractions are currently
allowed to escape under conflicts legislation because criminal prosecution
is deemed too harsh. 1 "
Distinctions Between the Codes and Conflicts Provisions.
As regards the problem of those business and financial interests of
public officials which may operate to tempt derogation from duty, the
approach of the codes differs from that of traditional conflicts legislation
in two significant respects. First, conflict-of-interests provisions condemn
only official interests in contracts let by the government, and thus touch
only those officers whose connections may give rise to contractual relations
with the public. The typical code provision, on the other hand, is couched
in terms which focus upon the existence of any business or financial interest which may affect the proper discharge of an official's duties; the sphere
of contractual interests is not singled out for special prohibition.
The significance of this extension of scope should be immediately
apparent. Suppose that an individual in the real estate business serves on
the Philadelphia City Planning Commission, an agency which recommends
plans for the future development of the physical plant of the city, and which
141. N.Y. Pun. OFFIcERs LAW § 74(3) (a); Los Angeles Proposal; New York
City Code Proposal § 1, ch. 40, § 89.1-0(j).
142. Los Angeles Proposal; Philadelphia Code § 7: "A City officer or employee
should not by his conduct give reasonable basis for the public impression that any
person can improperly influence or unduly engage his favor in performance of his
official duties, or that he is affected by the kinship, rank, position or influence of any
person or organization, nor should he engage in any conduct which will raise public
suspicion that he is acting contrary to his public trust."
143. E.g., New York City Charter Proposal §§ 886(5), (6) : "Any violation . . .
shall . . . render forfeit and void the contract . . . [and] shall constitute cause for

fine, suspension or removal from office or employment."
144. Interview With Counsel for the City Council of the City of New York, S.
Stanley Kreutzer, in New York City, Oct 24, 1958. The greater desirability of
non-penal regulation of conflicts problems is not intended to be offered as an argument
for codes qua codes, as opposed to conflicts legislation. Penal sanctions may of course
be deleted from existing legislation without alteration of its particular substantive
scope and direction. The questions of defining duties and of providing punishments
for failure of those duties are to that extent separable. The point suggested is merely
that such a scheme of non-criminal sanctions as is typically represented by the code
approach is preferable to the penal sanction system of traditional conflicts legislation.

1959]

CONFLICT-OF-INTERESTS

Assuming
may recommend specific future purchases of real property.1'
coverage under the Philadelphia conflict-of-interests provision, 146 his real
estate connections present no objection to his public service unless and
until some particular contract obtains between the city and his business
firm. However, under the code provision, his general real estate interests
may be deemed of themselves so to affect his official discretion as to make
necessary either elimination of those interests or his disqualification from
service. In fact, a person serving in such capacity is given opportunity
to benefit himself in ways other than those which will ultimately involve
contracting with the city. Zoning recommendations may increase the value
of certain of his holdings; similarly, improvement of an area where he has
property may yield pecuniary benefits. Moreover, there is the possibility
that the city, upon recommendation, may take his property by eminent
domain proceedings, rather than by contract, paying for it a market value
which will usually have risen because of the city's interest. Thus the code
provision more fully and realistically covers the conflicting interest situation which may arise from such a combination of public and private positions than does legislation explicitly word6d in terms of interests in
contracts.
Presented with this hypothetical situation, some of the officials interviewed expressed the opinion that this kind of broad prohibition would
serve to deprive the government of the services of precisely those experts
for whom the advisory commission system was designed: here, the judgments of the professional real estate man on the Planning Commission.
Persons best qualified to serve in responsible advisory capacities, they
felt, would invariably have private interests in the area of their greatest
expertise. While those who pose this objection recognize that very real
dangers inhere in such potentially self-dealing situations, they feel that
a blanket proscription from public service is an unnecessarily severe safeguard. Rather they offer the alternative solution of requiring disclosure
of his interests on the part of the interested person.
Upon a balance, this may well be the most feasible plan. It has been
suggested that disclosure, by calling to the conscious attention of the disclosing agency member himself the extent of his conflicting private interests, will encourage more intensive reflection on the impact of his decisions upon the public good. While it seems incautious to attribute too
great vitality to this psychological safeguard, it should not be entirely
discounted. With the press, opposing political party, and the community
145. CHARTR §2-303(3) (adoption and amendment of the capital budget ordinance); §4-603 (approves plans for streets and land subdivision plans); §4-600
(prepares and adopts a physical development plan); § 4-601 (prepares zoning ordinances).
146. Coverage will depend upon whether members of the Planning Commission
are deemed city "employees," or "other governmental officers." The former are
covered in any event, whereas the latter are covered only if they receive their compensation from the city treasury. Since members serve without compensation, the
distinction is crucial. CHr=rT § 10-102. See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
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in general having this information, the official is aware that his integrity
is likely to be impugned by any recommendation of a public course of
action pecuniarily favorable to himself, and which he cannot support by
cogent and convincing reasoning. As the men who serve on these agencies
are frequently persons of considerable stature who contribute their services
for the psychic reward of community service, this sanction is likely to have
no small effect. There is, of course, the danger that the interested official,
knowing, after disclosure, that he will be the focus of severe critical scrutiny, may find his best judgment impaired by a desire to "bend over
backward" to avoid the appearance of bias. To say, however, that, in such
a situation, he may voluntarily abstain from passing decisive judgment,
will sufficiently protect the integrity of his person without depriving the
city of his services in even those matters in which he has in fact no outside interest. But a more substantial advantage of the disclosure requirement, of course, would be to insure that the other members of the
board, as well as the legislature or the executive, where the agency's
function is to recommend action to them, may evaluate the decision of
the disclosant in light of possible personal, pecuniary motivations. It
should be noted that, in the similar case of the interlocking corporate
director, the law imposes no blanket disqualification. 47 The analogy is
not inappropriate. The person best qualified to serve as a corporate
director is the one experienced in the commercial world, who is thus
likely to have other interests which may sometimes tend to conflict with
those of the corporation. Many corporations not only cannot afford
directors who are not engaged in other pursuits, but find it positively
desirable to retain persons whose outlook is not restricted and parochial.
It would appear certainly equally desirable that the governmental policy
makers should have access to the widest possible latitude of experience
and expert judgment.
The second significant distinction between the codes and conflicts
legislation pertains to the requisite damning relation between the public
duties of an official and his private interest. Conflict-of-interests proscription applies regardless of any official connection of the interested officer
with the particular transaction constituting his interest; the fact of government employment itself is the only relation required. The codes, on
the other hand, are framed in terms of only those interests which may
affect the proper discharge of the interested person's own public duties.
Indeed, since code "interests" extend to any business or financial involve147. The prevailing view in corporation law is that contracts are not voidable
merely by reason of conflicting duties or interests as to corporations represented,
even where a majority or all of the voting directors are common to both corporations.
The courts will scrutinize the fairness and reasonableness of the contract to prevent
overreaching.

BALLAixn,

CoRpoRATioNs 179 (1946)

and cases cited therein.

See

also Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 20, 89 A.2d 862 (Ct. Ch. 1952) ;
Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378 (1918);
Angelus Sec. Corp. v. Ball, 20 Cal. App. 2d 436, 439, 67 P2d 158, 160 (2d App. Dist.
1937).
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ment, and not merely to contractual relations with the government, application of the restrictions regardless of official connection would, as Governor Dewey put it,148 deprive the government of the services of all save
the very rich or the very poor.
The implication for personnel recruitment of this distinction along
lines of particular official connection with interest transactions should be
apparent. While under the conflicts statutes, a public official must sever
himself from each and every private (contractual) interest, under the codes
he need be rid only of those interests which may come to influence his
specific government job. This character of the codes, again, reflects their
principal concentration upon the problem of conscientious performance
of their own duties by government agents. The problem of inter-agent
149
influence is in the codes separately treated.
Use of Advisory Committees
Possibly following the suggestion of Senator Douglas' report on
ethical standards in the federal government in 1951,150 the present New
York State legislation,' 5 ' as well as the proposals pending in Honolulu 1 52
and New York City, 153 provide for some form of advisory committee to
help in the administration of the code.154 Since the principles enunciated
by the codes are purposively broadly stated, in recognition of the difficulty
of framing exact standards to cover the infinite variety of situations that
might amount to self-dealing conduct, one of the prime functions of the
advisory committee is to help a requesting public official resolve the practical question of whether a particular situation encountered amounts to a
violation of the code.' 55 In the interest of development of precisely articulated specific standards, any opinion rendered in the matter, after
deleting references to the particular official, may be published as notice
156
to others similarly situated.
148. Quoted in State of New York, Special Legislative Comm. on Integrity and.
Ethical Standards in Government, Report and Hearings 1, LEG. Doc. No. 39 (1954).
149. See note 139 supra and accompanying text.
150. SUBCOMMnrrE OF SEINATE COMM. ox LABOR AN) PUBLIC WELFARE, 82NDCONG., IST. SEss., REPORT ON ETHICAL STANDARDS IN GOVERNMENT 17 (Comm. Print

1951).
151. N.Y. PUB. OFFicmRs LAW § 74(4).
152. Honolulu Proposal § 3.
153. New York City Code Proposal § B1-7.0.
154. Under the New York system, the advisory committee is established by the
state Attorney General from personnel in the Department of Law. N.Y. EXECUTvE
LAW § 74(1). Under the proposed Honolulu plan, the Mayor, subject to confirmation
by the city's Board of Supervisors, would appoint seven men, at least two of whonm
would be members of the Democratic Party, and two of the Republican Party.
Honolulu Proposal § 3 (a).
155. Both the New York act and the Honolulu proposal provide that only government personnel may ask for advisory opinions. N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 74(Z) (a);
Honolulu Proposal § 3 (b) (2).
156. E.g., New York City Code Proposal § B1-7.0(b) : "The board shall render
advisory opinions to officers and employees . . . pursuant to written request by the

officer or employee concerned. The board shall publish its advisory opinions with
such deletions as may be necessary to prevent disclosure of the identity of the officer
or employee involved."

1024

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107

The committee may also serve as an integral part of the enforcement
scheme. Under the New York system, the Attorney General may submit
his findings upon complaints concerning code violations to the advisory
committee for their interpretation and their recommendations as to the
kind of enforcement that should be effected. 157 The Honolulu proposal
vests even greater immediate responsibility in the advisory group. Under
that scheme, all public officers must disclose to the committee within thirty
days the acquisition of any interest which might amount to a conflict under
the code. The committee is then to decide whether a conflict exists and,
if so, whether it should be terminated or whether some arrangement may
be made to cope with the situation. If the official fails to abide by the
recommendations of the committee within thirty days after they are rendered, his interest is published for public notice.1 58
Critique of the Code System
There is as yet available little factual information as to the effectiveness in operation of the codes of ethics. The Texas statute is too recent, and
apparently little has been done under the New York State code save for
its dissemination among the several state agencies with some administrative analysis by the attorney general.' 59 A few tentative evaluative comments may nevertheless be here attempted.
It has already been noted as a desirable feature of the codes that
their non-penal nature may encourage more scrupulous enforcement. Government agencies may be quicker to clean their own nests where cleaning
does not involve the execution of criminal sanctions upon fellow officials.
We have also remarked above that the code principle which extends the
concept of "interest" to any private pecuniary involvement more adequately
covers the gamut of potential officer self-dealing situations than does the
more traditional contract-interest focus. Further, it will be observed that
the code approach of separating and distinctly treating the two problems
of, on the one hand, biasing self-interest in the performance of the interested officer's own governmental duties, and, on the other, inter-official
pressuring and persuasion by influence, accords with the analysis suggested in the first section of this Note.
The codes may also be commended as promising to provide more
exact standards by which public officials will be able to gauge the moral
temper of their conduct, and to know precisely what degree of disinterest
is expected of them. While some may feel that the principles enumerated
are so elementary as to add nothing to the vague prescriptions of prevailing public attitudes, it was the experience of the authors in interview157. N.Y. ExEcUT-w LAw § 63(11).
158. Honolulu Proposal § 4.
159. State of New York, Statement by Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz
Relative to Statutory Prohibitions Dealing With Private Interests and Activities of
State Officers and Employees, Jan. 2, 1959.
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ing many Philadelphia public officials as to their own attitudes toward
such moral prescriptions, that there existed sufficient divergence of opinion
about what was proper official conduct to make useful the pronouncement
of more definitive standards. It must be noted that while the code provisions themselves are in general designedly vague, their elucidation and
application to precise factual situations by advisory committee opinions is
the practical essence of the plan. Advisory opinions will undoubtedly be of
great assistance to the scrupulous official who finds that a particular business or professional transaction places him within an uncharted area of
ethical considerations. Without some official declaration on the matter,
such an official must either proceed at the risk of being challenged for
improper conduct or entirely forego the potential fruits of the venture. A
committee's opinion might very well save for him transactions from which
he would otherwise have overcautiously refrained. The legal profession
has long recognized the advantage of definitive, authoritative prior ethical
pronouncement, and many bar associations have a committee on ethics
which serves the same type of advisory function as do the code committees. The same pronounced standards would also allow others more
appropriately to gauge the conduct of officials: the press, the public, local
civic organizations, opposing political factions. And the formulation of
more clearly articulated and uniformly accepted guiding principles would,
by reaction, encourage more meticulous self-policing on the part of an
official who knows that deviation from such principles may be publicly
decried by appeal to an observable objective standard.
Utilization of the code system, however, is not without several
troublesome problems. One city official raised the challenge that a pronouncement of what is to be normally expected of public officers shifts
the burden of responsibility from conscience to the rationalizing faculty,
and may encourage a public official to act where he previously would not
have acted so soon as he finds that the code does not condemn such action.
Many persons raised the objection that the phrase "interfere with the
proper discharge of his duties," or some variation of it is as vague and unworkable a standard as is "'direct or indirect interest." Where there is an
advisory committee functioning as an integral part of the code's administration, this objection may be premature. Code terminology is purposively broad; it was hoped that this very vagueness would force the
use of the advisory committee, which in the process of rendering advisory
opinions and deciding infractions, would give body to the standards.
Where there is no committee, of course, this objection is most significant;
and even where the code scheme provides on paper for active participation
of an advisory group, there remains the persistent danger that the practical effectiveness of the code may be almost wholly destroyed by actual
non-activity of the committee.
This last point may suggest that not the least danger of the promulgation of a code of ethics is that the act of promulgation itself may tend to
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be looked upon by the responsible government as a panacea for conflict-ofinterests problems, or may operate as a single symbolic gesture by which
that government effectively washes its hands of the affair. Codes, however, will be effective only insofar as they are elucidated, administered,
enforced. They are useful tools both for ensuring the moral awareness
of public service personnel and for ridding government forces of the
morally unfit. But the tool must be used. Responsibility will remain upon
the heads of government and of its several departments and agencies to
secure by conscientious enforcement the fair and unprejudiced evenhandedness of public government.
And ultimately, of course, no procedural implement, however well
conceived and well enforced, can, of itself, guarantee administrative honesty. We have remarked above that one of the chief flaws of too stringent,
ill-directed conflicts legislation is its tendency to make unavailable for
public service a large body of persons of the highest caliber of professional
competence and moral rectitude, persons whose very presence in the governmental ranks would go far toward assuring a pervading climate of
scrupulous, disinterested responsibility. This apparently self-defeating
effect may serve to point again to the central importance of the personnel
recruitment problem for the securing of an honest, as well as an efficient,
administration. In the last analysis, it is the man, rather than the rule
by which he is governed, to whom we must look for the maintenance of
enduring standards of governmental integrity.
G.B.
L. K.

